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Abstract
Trusted employees pose a major threat to information systems. Despite advances in prevention, detection, and response techniques, the number of malicious
insider incidents and their associated costs have yet to decline. There are very few
vulnerability and impact models capable of providing information owners with the
ability to comprehensively assess the effectiveness an organization’s malicious insider
mitigation strategies.
This research uses a multi-dimensional approach: content analysis, attack tree
framework, and an intent driven taxonomy model are used to develop a malicious
insider Decision Support System (DSS) tool. The tool’s output provides an assessment of a malicious insider’s composite vulnerability levels based upon aggregated
vulnerability assessment and impact assessment levels.
The DSS tool’s utility and applicability is demonstrated using a notional example. This research gives information owners data to more appropriately allocate
scarce security resources.
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Development of an Malicious Insider Composite
Vulnerability Assessment Methodology

I. Introduction
1.1

Motivation
Until recently, organizations allocated most of their network and computer se-

curity budgets to securing network perimeters from outside attacks [30]. Focusing
the majority of resources on protecting from outside attacks left information systems
vulnerable to threats originating from within.
While the ratio of malicious actions due to insider attacks compared to outsider
attacks varies between studies, researchers agree that malicious insider attacks have
become a more prevalent threat to information systems and their associated adverse
impacts can no longer be ignored [3, 15, 16, 20, 21]. In fact, the number of successful
insider attacks are believed to be much higher then research indicates because many
organizations do not report them for a variety of reasons. The most common reasons
for 2005 are shown in Figure 1.1 [16].
Monetary losses incurred as a result of successful insider attacks can cripple an
organization. In one case a “trusted” employee wrote a logic bomb that deleted a
critical application which cost the organization over $10 million dollars in losses and
the subsequent layoff of 80 employees [7]. In another well known insider threat case, a
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) agent, Aldrich Ames, supplied Russian adversaries
with sensitive information that cost fellow CIA operatives their lives [35]. Analysis
of known Malicious Insiders (MIs) indicates that any organization using information
systems is susceptible to insider threats [18, 22, 35].
The threat posed by MIs presents a tremendous problem to security personnel
who must develop and implement new mitigation strategies to protect critical organizational data. Traditional prevention and detection methods have limited effect
1
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Figure 1.1:

Non-Reporting Trends (639 respondents) [16]

against insider threats. While various methods have been used to prevent and detect
insider threat activities, the frequency and costs associated with insider threat exploits have yet to decline [13–16]. Therefore, there remains a need for new methods
to address the threat. However, simply investing money without an overall strategy to
deal with problem can be both costly and ineffective. Therefore, an MI vulnerability
assessment process that provides organizations a cost effective and reliable means for
assessing and protecting against insider threats is needed.
1.2

Background
MIs are difficult to detect until after the damage has been incurred. Since most

organizations rely on robust perimeters to protect from outside attacks [30]. Other
contributing factors include: the level of trust given to employees, use of authorized
access to conduct malicious actions, and the non-technical ease of exercising MI attacks [31].
Organizations often underestimate the potential threat from assuming typical
system users do not posses the technical knowledge to carry out sophisticated attacks.
The Internet offers a wide range of automated attack tools that provide sophisticated
attacks to internal users having a low level of system access (Figure 1.2) [1].
Insider threat assessment research is examining increasingly effective methods to
mitigate the MI. Anomaly detection, signature analysis, network monitoring sensors,

2

Figure 1.2:

Historical Information Systems Attack Trends [1]

social network analysis, honey pots, and honey tokens are some of the primary MI
areas of interest [3, 24, 30, 32, 33, 38].
While the research areas are significant contributions in the prevention and
detection of potential insider threats, organizational management and security personnel also need to identify various MI actions that organizations must defend against.
Furthermore, insider threat assessments that enable information owners to better understand their current MI vulnerability levels would also be of great benifit.
1.3

Purpose
This research provides information owners a methodology to determine an or-

ganization’s malicious insider vulnerability levels. This, in turn provides a means of
identifying and reducing risks to an acceptable level.
1.3.1 Objectives.

The first objective of this research is to expand and im-

prove an existing Insider Threat Functional Decomposition Model (ITFDM) [4]. The

3

expanded ITFDM provides information owners with a standard method of identifying
malicious actions.
The second objective of this research is to develop a process for conducting MI
vulnerability assessments capable of providing information owners with qualitative
and quantitative vulnerability metrics which measure an organization’s current insider
threat vulnerability level.
The final objective is to develop an MI impact assessment Decision Support
System (DSS) that provides information owners with the means to assess the adverse
effects of a successful exploit. The information owners can use this impact assessment
results to evaluate and tailor MI mitigation strategies.
1.4

Scope
The application of the result of this research are intended for an organization’s

individual business units and not the organization as a whole. This scope allows
for a sufficiently granular approach to vulnerability assessment by evaluating the
effectiveness of MI mitigation strategies for each business unit.
Recent literature supports the notion that the majority of insider threat malicious activities did not require administrator access or a high degree of technical
knowledge as shown in Figure 1.2. Therefore, this research focuses primarily on insider threats originating from users with typical system access [6]. Typical users can
compromise critical company data by simply copying, e-mailing, or deleting a file
from the server using the same access they use for their jobs, but with the intent of
doing harm to their organization [7].
Typical users who unintentionally harm their organization’s information system
by accidently deleting a critical file or unknowingly compromising their password are
another recognized category of insider threats, but are not addressed in this research.
The terms insider threats and MI refer specifically to system users who intentionally
exercise malicious actions within an organization’s information system infrastructure.

4

1.5

Limitations
The insider threat taxonomy model developed in this research specifically ad-

dresses non-technical malicious insiders. MIs having technical networking skills or
system administrator privileges introduce additional ways of exploiting system vulnerabilities. However, an additional insider threat action model that addresses technical users with system administrator privileges could be developed using an approach
similar to that developed herein.
1.6

Intended Audience and Assumptions
This thesis assumes the reader is familiar with information systems and in-

formation technology terminology. Furthermore, this work assumes a basic level of
understanding of commonly performed malicious actions.
Regardless of the robustness of MI mitigation strategies, every organization’s
information systems include some level of risk. However, the level of robustness of MI
mitigation strategies do influence the risk levels.
During the course of this document, the terms insider threat and malicious
insider (MI) are used interchangeably. Additional assumptions are discussed later in
this document.
1.7

Document Overview
Chapter II presents an overview of current insider threat topics to include: char-

acteristics, case studies, trends, risk assessment, information security as well as related
research. Chapter III presents the methodologies used to achieve the objectives of this
work. Chapter IV presents a notional example that demonstrates the practical application of an expanded insider threat decomposition model as well as MI vulnerability
and impact assessment methodologies. Finally, Chapter V presents a summary of the
research conclusions and recommended areas for future research.

5

II. Literature Review
This chapter presents insider threat: (1) background, (2) various detection challenges,
(3) case studies, and (4) trends. The remainder of the chapter discusses related work
and fundamental insider threat concepts.
2.1

Insider Threat Background
The proceedings of the 2005 Advanced Research and Development Activity

(ARDA) challenge workshop, provides a comprehensive insider threat definition:
An insider is anyone in an organization with approved access, privilege, or
knowledge of information systems, information services, and missions. A
malicious insider is one motivated to adversely impact an organization’s
mission through a range of actions that compromise information confidentiality, integrity, and/or availability [25].
2.1.1 Insider Threats Challenges.

Insider threat detection is a very difficult

problem. Organizations assume that their employees do not pose a significant threat
to their information systems. One of the main contributing factors to this belief is the
level of trust given to employees. It makes little sense to consider a new employee who
was an“outsider” a week earlier, trust worthy. Their employment does not establish
loyalty to the organization, nor does it mean that they would not perform malicious
actions [7].
Another problem is the continued difficulty of of pairing a common profile to
the threat. Law enforcement creates profiles for different types of crimes such as a
kidnapper, bank robber, or murderer [30]. “However, with insider threats there is no
demographic profile. People who have been caught vary in age, sex, social background,
and education and cover the entire range of categories of people” [7].
The last difficulty is that insider can perform malicious actions much easier than
outside attackers. Insider threats are more difficult to defend against due to their (1)
authorized access to the system, (2) knowledge of processes and security practices,
and (3) physical access to the system [37]. Systems security personnel can fairly
6

easily detect outside attackers attempting to break into an organization’s information
system; however, it is far more challenging to distinguish whether a trusted employee
who opens, modifies, copy’s, or deletes a file is doing so in the performance of their
duties or for malicious purposes.
2.1.2 Known Insider Threat Case Studies.

The following six case studies

illustrate the severe and sometimes devastating damage that has been inflicted across
a wide range of organizations by MIs. Examination of known insider attacks provides
valuable insight that can be used to develop more effective mitigation strategies.
Between 1986 to 1994, former CIA officer Aldrich Ames, received over $2.5 million dollars in exchange for providing classified CIA and FBI human source information to the Soviet Union [35]. Ames was sentenced to life in prison and is notoriously
known for selling out fellow CIA agents, who subsequently were killed as a result of
Ames’ betrayal. It is of interest to note that despite Ames’ spending beyond his means,
his malicious activities went undetected for eight years. This serves as yet another
example of an organization that did not understand its insider threat vulnerabilities
and the potential impact of malicious activities.
In 1999, Thomas Varlotta, a disgruntled O’Hare aviation engineer was charged
by a federal grand jury with damaging and stealing government property. He had
misused his authorized system access to delete all known copies of the computer code
that intended to fix errors in an application used to direct jetliners at the airport [18].
Varlotta drew suspicion when he quit the day after the code was deleted. A subsequent
search of his home found the stolen code, which was encrypted and took six months
to decipher.
In May 2000, Timothy Lloyd became the first American to be sentenced to prison
under Federal Law for deleting critical organizational files [23]. Lloyd was motivated
by revenge after his company demoted him. His organization, like many others, did
not have adequate strategies in place to identify Lloyd’s malicious actions. However,
the prosecution was able to prove his guilt after forensic analysis of a hard drive found
7

in his garage revealed time bomb code residing on it. His malicious actions cost his
organization, Omega Engineering, an estimated $10 million dollars in damage.
In 2002, disgruntled employee, Roger Duronio, had with revenge as his motive
when he planted a logic bomb on over 1,000 organizational computers. The resulting
damage from the logic bomb cost his employer, PaineWebber, over $3 million dollars
in monetary losses [7]. Duronio’s revenge was fueled by what he felt were inadequate
bonuses and a low salary.
In 2002, Melvyn Spillman was found guilty by a grand jury of using his computer
network system privileges to redirect more than $4.9 million dollars from personal
estate’s liquidated assets into his personal banking accounting [7]. Spillman was
motivated by greed, and like several other known MI’s, his extravagant spending
went unnoticed. In the three year period prior to being caught, Spillman sponsored
a Formula One racing car despite having an annual salary of $33,000. Replacement
parts alone for the racing car totaled over $250,000 in a single quarter [7].
In 2003, American Online (AOL) employee, Jason Smathers, used a fellow employee’s access to obtain the screen names of over 92 million AOL customers. The
employee subsequently sold the list to a third party for $100,000. In turn, the third
party then sold the list yet again. The compromised customer list resulted in the
customers on the list being spammed. The largest adverse impact to AOL was a
tarnished reputation due to the organization’s inability to protect sensitive customer
information from their own employees. The incident also ended up in the Washington
Post which had an adverse impact on potential customers [22].
While MI’s do not share a common demographic profile, analysis of known insider threat cases have found some similarities exist between attackers. The following
list provides the most commonly shared MI characteristics [36]:
• Minimal technical knowledge
• Attacks focused on intellectual property (IP)
• Driven by greed and revenge
8

• Displayed external indicators prior to their malicious actions (e.g., living outside
of their means)
• Malicious actions typically resulted in greater monetary losses than would outside attacks
2.1.3 Insider Threat Studies.

Prior studies provide a better understanding

of insider threats, therefore findings from recent workshops, reports, and surveys are
used to further understand the insider threat problem.
2.1.3.1 2005 Insider Threat Study.

The United States Secret Ser-

vice and the Carnegie Mellon Software Institute released their second annual Insider
Threat report in May 2005. The purpose of the report was to document and better
understand MI activities affecting information systems and data in critical infrastructure sectors [20]. The report examined forty-nine known insider threat cases that
occurred between 1996 and 2002. This report found MIs were primarily motivated
by revenge were more apt to perform acts of sabotage; whereas, MIs motivated by
greed were more likely to exploit an organization’s critical information. In 61% of
the cases, insiders used unsophisticated methods of attack, which supports the notion that typical system users pose a serious threat to an organizations information
systems [20].
The various methods of attack include automated scripts, toolkits, flooding,
probing, escalation of privileges, scanning, and compromising another users account.
In 56% of the cases remote account access was used.
Additionally, in 81% of the cases organizations experienced some financial loss as
shown in Table 2.1. In 49% of the cases the average financial loss per internal malicious
action was estimated at over $50,000. In 11% of the cases, losses totaled over $1 million
per incident. These alarming figures further demonstrate the need of organizations to
identify MI vulnerabilities and apply appropriate mitigation strategies. The figures
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Table 2.1:

Organizational Monetary Losses from Insider Threats [20]

Percentage of Organizations

Monetary Loss

2

Greater than $10,000,000

9

$1,000,000 - $5,000,000

7

$200,001 - $300,000

2

$100,001 - $200,000

11

$50,001 - $100,000

9

$20,001 - $50,000

42

$1 - $20,000

are based on data collected from 1996 to 2002. Losses today would likely be higher
as organizations have increasingly invested in and rely upon information systems.
In many cases, insider attacks could have been prevented through the monitoring of employee behavior combined with a continued focus on reducing information
systems vulnerabilities. The following lists the key findings from the Carnegie Mellon
report [5]:
• Most insider attacks were triggered a result of negative work-related events
• 62% of the attacks were planned in advance
• 57% of the insider attacks exploited existing applications, processes, and/or
procedure vulnerabilities
• 61% of the insider attacks did not require sophisticated attack tools
• Insider attacks caused financial losses 85% of the time and a negative impact
to business operations 75% of the time
2.1.3.2 Survey Trends.

Over the past 10 years, the Computer Secu-

rity Institute (CSI) and the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) have produced
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the longest known continuous computer crime security survey of its kind (CSI/FBI
Computer Crime and Security Survey). The aim of the computer crime survey is to
raise the level of security awareness as well as help determine the scope of computer
crime in the United States [13].
The survey annually mails out anywhere from 3,500 to 5,000 surveys to computer security professionals working for corporations, financial institutions, government agencies, and universities within the United States. Yearly survey responses
have ranged anywhere from 501 to 700 participants [13, 15, 16]. The 2005 CSI/FBI
survey results indicated insiders are involved in nearly half of the known computer
security incidents experienced by an organization (Table 2.2). The survey results also
indicate similar rates of insider attack over the past four years. Thus, insider threats
are not losing momentum.
Table 2.2:

CSI/FBI Computer Security Incidents [16]

Number of insider threat
incidents by % of respondents

1-5

2005

46

7

3

44

2004

52

6

8

34

2003

45

11

12

33

2002

42

13

9

35

2001

40

12

7

41

2000

38

16

9

37

1999

37

16

12

35

6-10 >10 Don’t know

While the actual costs per incident as reported by insider threat research vary,
the CSI/FBI survey has produced useful results that show the monetary loss incurred
as a result of the most commonly performed malicious actions. Figure 2.1 illustrates
the financial losses reported by organizations due to information systems security
attacks in 2005. When compared to previous CSI/FBI computer security results,
the figures indicate the increasing costs of virus-based attacks, theft of proprietary
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information, and unauthorized access. Collectively, these three categories accounted
for over 80% of the reported financial loses in 2005. Each of the three categories
can be accomplished using available means such as misusing authorized access and
executing any number of malicious scripts available on the Internet. Typical system
users are therefore in a prime position to carry out each of the these three increasing
types of attacks using their granted access, knowledge of the system, and assumed
level of trust [8].

Total Reported Losses for 2005 totaled $130,104,542
Virus

$42,787,767

Unauthorized access

$31,233,100

Theft of proprietary info

$30,933,000

Malicious Action

Denial of service

$7,310,725

Laptop theft

$4,107,300

Financial fraud

$2,565,000

Misuse of public Web application

$2,227,500

System penetration

$841,400

Insider net abuse

$685,450

Abuse of wireless network

$544,700

Sabotage

$340,600

Telecom fraud

$242,000

Web site defacement

$115,000
$0

$10,000,000

$20,000,000

$30,000,000

$40,000,000

$50,000,000

Total Losses

Figure 2.1:

2005 Reported Monetary Loss (N=690) [16]

Another notable survey finding is the percentage of the overall Information Technology (IT) budget that each organization allocates to its security budget. While the
survey only recently started to include IT budget questions, there are some interesting
conclusions that one can draw from the survey results. Figure 2.2 illustrates that 75%
of the 2005 survey respondents spent between 1% and 10% of their total IT budget
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Unknown
More than 10%
Less than 1%
8-10%
6-7%
3-5%
1-2%
0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

Percentage of IT Budgets Spent on Computer Security in 2005

Figure 2.2:
(N=690) [16]

% of IT Budgets Spent on Security in 2005

on system security, as opposed to 7% in 2004 [16]. This is a 3% increase from 2004,
which indicates that organizations are allocating more of their IT budges to secure
their network infrastructure. Another indicator that highlights an upward trend in
IT spending is only 11% of the 2005 survey respondents reported spending less than
1% of the overall IT budget on system security, as opposed to the 16% reported in
the 2004 survey.
One trend in the survey that has not been adequately addressed is the average
cost of a successful insider threat incident. Many security professionals participating in the survey did not to disclose how much financial loss was incurred by their
organizations as a result of MI activities. For those who did provide results, there
is no means by which to verify the numbers because the survey is anonymous. For
example, in 2002 the CSI/FBI survey results estimated the average financial loss per
insider threat incident at approximately $2 million. In the 2003 survey, this number
increased to over $2.7 million per incident and in 2004 that number fell to $526,000
per incident. The 2005 survey results reports a $203,000 loss per incident [13–16]. The
figures are often guesses at best that vary depending on how each respondent measures lost revenues. While a disparity exists in the reported financial losses, even the
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smallest reported figure of $203,000 per incident indicates that MI actions are costly
to an organization. This is especially true considering that insider threats comprise
46% of known computer system attacks [16].
2.1.4 Background summary.

Some key concepts discussed in this back-

ground summary include:
• Malicious insider actions can and do occur in any organization
• The majority of malicious actions use non-technical means
• Insider threats are commonly motivated by greed or revenge
• Insider attacks are generally more costly than attacks originating from the outside
• Insider threat statistics can be misleading, because many are not reported
• Observable action models may provide a potential means in identifying and
mitigating insider threats
2.2

Risk Assessment
Risk Assessment is, “The process of identifying the risks to system security and

determining the probability of occurrence, the resulting impact, and additional safeguards that would mitigate this impact” [11]. A risk assessment can be accomplished
either quantitatively, qualitatively or via a combination of the two. A threat assessment is a process that organizations can use to prioritize and determine what critical
data needs to be protected.
2.3

Definitions
Having a general understanding of the overall risk assessment process provides

a top-level view that can be used to develop a more effective MI vulnerability and
impact assessment process model. While there are several variations, risk can be
quantified as [7]:
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Risk =

threat ∗ vulnerabilities ∗ probability ∗ impact
countermeasures
.

(2.1)

Risk is defined by The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
as “The net mission impact considering (1) the probability that a particular threatsource will exercise (accidentally trigger or intentionally exploit) a particular information system vulnerability and (2) the resulting impact if this should occur” [11].
Assessing risks to critical data enable an organization to identify and reduce those
risks to an acceptable level.
Threat is defined as, “The potential for a threat-source to exercise (accidentally
trigger or intentionally exploit) a specific vulnerability” [11]. Possible MI dangers
attributed to information systems include violations of one or more protection states
(unauthorized alteration, distribution, snooping and elevation) [2]. For example, the
potential for an authorized user to perform unauthorized malicious activities is a
threat.
Vulnerability is “A flaw or weakness in system security procedures, design, implementation, or internal controls that could be performed (accidentally triggered or
intentionally exploited) and result in a security breach or a violation of the systems
security policy” [11]. The effectiveness of threat mitigation strategies have a direct
impact on information systems vulnerability levels. For example, an organization
with inadequate File Transfer Protocal (FTP) vulnerability mitigation strategies are
susceptible to MIs distributing proprietary information to unauthorized entities.
Probability is “... the likelihood that a potential vulnerability could be performed by a given threat-source” [11]. Probability is a difficult component of the risk
formula to determine because it involves human factors. There is no way of being
certain which employee will become an insider threat.
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Impact is “... the adverse impact resulting from a successful threat exercise
of a vulnerability (e.g.,, loss of public confidence, loss of credibility, damage to an
organizations interest)” [11]. Impact levels can not be typically reduced without
decreasing an information system’s capabilities. The value of an organization’s critical
data has a direct bearing on adverse impact levels resulting from MI activities.
Countermeasure is “... the deployment of multiple defense mechanisms between
the adversary and the target. To reduce the likelihood or affordability of successful
attacks, each mechanism should present unique obstacles and include both protection
and detection measures [10]. Implementing configuration management changes to
prevent users from accessing external FTP sites is an example.
Information Owners are “ System users who are responsible for ensuring that
proper controls are in place to address integrity, confidentiality, and availability of the
IT systems and the data they own” [11].
2.3.1 Risk Mitigation Options.

The key components of a risk assessment

model are threats and vulnerabilities. In the absence of any threat, there is no need
to continue with the risk assessment process because the vulnerability cannot be exploited. However, threats inherently exist for critical data residing within information
systems. This makes vulnerability the true key to the risk assessment process. After
conducting a risk assessment, information owners may use the results to select one of
six commonly used mitigation strategies [11]:
1. Risk Assumption: “To accept the potential risk and continue operating the IT
system or to implement controls to lower the risk to an acceptable level.”
2. Risk Avoidance: “To avoid the risk by eliminating the risk cause and/or consequence (e.g., forgo certain functions of the system or shut down the system
when risks are identified).”
3. Risk Transference: “To transfer the risk by using other options to compensate
for the loss, such as purchasing insurance.”
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4. Risk Limitation: “To limit the risk by implementing controls that minimize the
adverse impact of a threats exercising a vulnerability (e.g., use of supporting,
preventive, detective controls).”
5. Risk Planning: “To manage risk by developing a risk mitigation plan that prioritizes, implements, and maintains controls.”
6. Research and Development: “Research and Acknowledgment. To lower the risk
of loss by acknowledging the vulnerability or flaw and researching controls to
correct the vulnerability.”
Once MI vulnerabilities have been assessed, knowledge of the potential impacts
will aid information owners in determining which risk mitigation strategy is most
appropriate.
2.4

Information Systems Security
The following section discusses fundamental concepts that are an integral part of

this research. To protect critical data, information owners need a method to determine
and implement mitigation strategies that provide an acceptable level of risk.
2.4.1 Critical Data.

Not all electronic data require the same level of pro-

tection. While various types of data reside on information systems, some data is
considered more important and therefore requires added protection (e.g., mission essential data, data required by law to protect, and classified data).
Since organizations have a limited computer security budget, it is prudent for
an organization to focus on identifying and protecting data according to it’s assessed
value [15,16]. Monetary worth, future benefit to the company, competitive advantage,
as well as security classifications are various metrics that determine what data is most
critical to an organization [11].
2.4.2 Security Objectives.

MI actions adversely impact one or more of the

three common security objectives: Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability (CIA)
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[11]. Assessing the adverse impact to each of the three security objectives allows
information owners to more precisely determine the potential impact of MI actions.
Confidentiality is “... the protection of information from unauthorized disclosure” [11]. Critical information that an organization typically keep confidential include
trade secrets, proprietary data, classified data, and data protected due to legal requirements (e.g., Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPPA),
and Sarbanes-Oxley Act). If this information were to fall into the wrong hands it
could have an adverse effect to an organization. For example, a programmer that
uses their authorized access to copy proprietary software code and subsequently sells
the code to a competitor breaches the confidentiality security objective and gives the
competitor an unfair competitive advantage.
A loss of integrity is “... unauthorized changes made to the data or IT system
by either intentional or accidental acts. If the loss of system or data integrity is not
corrected, continued use of the contaminated system or corrupted data could result
in inaccuracy, fraud, or erroneous decisions” [11]. The unauthorized modifications of
critical data could prove detrimental to an organization. For an example, MI activities
that compromise integrity could result in loss of life or poor decisions that could ruin
a business.
A loss of availability is “The unavailability of an information system to its end
users” [11]. Various methods to compromise data availability include denial of service
(DOS), deleting critical files, or physically sabotaging a backup power supply. A
loss of system information availability may result in a loss of productive time, thus
potentially preventing system users accomplishing the organization’s mission.
2.4.3 Information Security Elements.

The three information security el-

ements include Prevention, Detection, and Response (PDR). Assessing each of the
PDR element’s security levels provides information owners a method of measuring
the effectiveness of an organizations MI mitigation strategies.
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Prevention includes security controls that prevent insider threats from successfully exercising their methods (actions) of attack. Various preventive measures include
authentication, authorization, nonrepudiation, encryption, and access controls [11].
Detection includes security controls that identify possible malicious activity and
warn network/computer security personnel. Various detection measures include auditing intrusion detection systems [11].
Response includes security measures that mitigate the impact of malicious attacks to include: response and recovery plans, pre-established response teams, and
environmental security (e.g., smoke alarms and sprinkler systems) [11].
Information security PDR levels are determined by the effectiveness of mitigation strategies that to protect data critical. Preventive security measures typically
cost more to implement than detection measures. The robustness of the preventive
measures depend on the value information owners place on their critical data [6]. For
example, the FBI would likely have more robust and costly preventive measures to
protect their most critical data than would a public library. In the case of a public
library, MI detection measures that are less costly than preventive measures would
likely be appropriate.
2.5

Related Work
This research effort combines prior taxonomies and vulnerability assessment pro-

cesses in order to develop a more comprehensive MI composite vulnerability process.
This section discusses various vulnerability and impact assessment methodologies.
Before determining insider threat countermeasures, it is first necessary to identify the threats and understand the MI’s intentions and their associated actions.
Cyber Observable and Attack Models [3] as well as Butts’s Insider Threat Functional
Decomposition Model (ITFDM) [4] describe approaches for identifying and classifying
the more prevalent MI actions.
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Figure 2.3:

Cyber Observables Taxonomy [25]

2.5.1 Cyber Observable Taxonomy Model.

The insider threat workshop con-

ducted at the 2004 RAND conference produced two notable insider threat taxonomy
models [3]. The Cyber Observables taxonomy model lists numerous observable malicious insider threat behaviors (i.e., actions) [3]. Figure 2.3 is the Cyber Observables
taxonomy model. The model identifies and classifies methods used to carry out malicious activities. The Cyber Observables taxonomy model is one of the first known
frameworks that identifies insider threat methods used to exploit vulnerabilities.
2.5.2 Attack Taxonomy Model.

The Attack Taxonomy Model is based upon

the analysis of known insider threat case studies which identified 33 methods (i.e.,
actions) to exploit information system vulnerabilities.
The Cyber Observable and Attack Tree Taxonomy models identified various
malicious actions performed by MI’s. ITFDM systematically incorporates and categorizes malicious actions identified by various sources (e.g., Cyber Observables and
Attack Tree Taxonomy models), into a single framework using the Schematic Protection Model (SPM), attack trees, and functional decomposition. The ITFDM is a
formalized model capable of categorizing unauthorized insider actions [4].
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The protection state of a system is determined by the privileges possessed to
the subjects (e.g., authorized users) [28]. ITFDM assumes that every potential user
action results in an observable event in one or more of the following four exploits [4]:
1. Alteration. Alteration is the unauthorized modification of the information on an
information system. Installing a key logger on a computer or deleting a critical
database are two examples. In both cases the MI altered an object from one
state to another in an unauthorized manner.
2. Distribution. Distribution is the unauthorized transfer of information from one
entity to another. An example is a user who misuses authorized system privileges
to transfer (e.g., electronic mail) a sensitive file to an unauthorized user.
3. Snooping. Snooping involves accessing or viewing information without a needto-know. An example is a user who misuses authorized system privileges to
access and/or view files without a valid need-to-known (e.g., employee salaries).
4. Elevation. Elevation occurs when a user escalates their system privileges beyond
what was authorized. For instance, when a user gains unauthorized privileged
access to a system which exceeds those previously assigned.
2.5.2.1 Attack Trees.

Attack trees provide the ITFDM with a hierar-

chical way to describe the security of a system [29]. The attack tree approach also
allows the ITFDM to decompose the malicious insider threat. Figure 2.4 illustrates
an example of the attack tree approach that categorizes the four actions of the MI.
Malicious
Insider

ACTIONS

Alteration Distribution Snooping

Figure 2.4:

Elevation

Root and 1st Tier ITFDM Action Leaf Nodes [4]
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A key notion of attack trees is if a leaf node can be compromised, then the
corresponding parent node is vulnerable as well. Figure 2.5 is an example of the
parent to leaf node relationship using a combination safe (i.e., vulnerability) as the
parent node. The leaf nodes describes various ways to compromise the safe (i.e.,
parent). If any of the methods can be successfully exploited, then the parent node is
vulnerable. Attack trees allow information owners to identify the compromise vectors
of the parent node.
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Figure 2.5:
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2.5.2.2 Functional Decomposition.

ITFDM systematically decom-

poses MI actions. The resulting hierarchical structure provides a visual mapping
of the precise path taken by the MI [4]. Figure 2.6 shows various paths a malicious
insider could take to perform an unauthorized distribution. The greatest benefit of
ITFDM is that it provides a comprehensive representation of possible insider threat
actions.
The multidisciplinary approach of the ITFDM is more conducive for further
development of an MI taxonomy. This strategy would enable an organization to
precisely analyze and assess insider threat activities.
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2.5.3 Vulnerability Assessment.

Vulnerability assessments (VA) are a way to

evaluate MI vulnerability levels and mitigation strategies [11,19,27]. For example, if a
VA determines current mitigation strategies do not account for an MI installing a root
kit on an information system, additional mitigation strategies should be considered.
After implementing further mitigation strategies, another VA could be performed to
determine if the vulnerability to the root kits has been reduced to an acceptable level
of risk. The following section discusses three VA methodologies to include: the Los
Alamos 12-step VA framework, The National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) Vulnerability Assessment process, and the NIST Vulnerability Assessment
Guide 800-30.
2.5.3.1 Los Alamos 12-Step Vulnerability Assessment Framework.
The 12-step VA framework uses a penetration testing strategy to identify, mitigate,
and re-assess methods of exercising malicious actions [19]. The primary assumption
of the framework relies upon the creativeness of individuals within a group to collaborate and identify possible methods that an MI could use to carry out malicious
actions. Consider the example of an open window [19]. A risk management process
would ignore the open window if a specific vulnerability wasn’t recognized; otherwise,
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the window would be closed and locked. The 12-step VA methodology would view the
open window as an opportunity for MI mischief [19]. While brainstorming, participants think like a “bad guy” and consider the worst case scenarios for every situation.
Below are the 12 steps identified in the VA model [19]:
1. Fully understand the device, system, or program and how it is really used
2. Play with it
3. Brainstorm
4. Play with it again
5. Edit and prioritize potential attacks
6. Partially develop some attacks
7. Determine feasibility of the attacks
8. Devise countermeasures
9. Perfect attacks
10. Demonstrate attacks
11. Rigorously test attacks
12. Rigorously test countermeasures
The application of the this framework is questionable due to vagueness of the 12step process. The framework relies upon the creative ability of brainstorming teams to
identify the actions an MI could use as opposed to using MI historical data to identify
potential MI actions. Another limitation is individual members of the brainstorming
team may conform to the general viewpoint of the group (i.e., group think). Because
of this phenomenon, the group would be in jeopardy of not identifying an appropriate
collection of MI actions. This VA process is also costly to an organization considering
the number of man-hours required to perform each step. The model depends upon the
diversity of the teams, and the experience of each member. Some organizations may
have the ability to put together a very diverse and experienced team, while others
may not.
2.5.3.2 NASA Vulnerability Assessment Process.

The NASA Proce-

dural Requirement (NPR) 1620.2 provides in-house compliance procedures for conducting physical vulnerability risk assessments [27]. The NPR outlines a systematic
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Table 2.3:

Asset Value Weighting [27]

Asset Characteristics

Value Weighting Factor

Fewer than 20 systems (i.e., computers) are in the facility.
Does not include super-computing system(s) or systems
processing sensitive or classified information.

1

Fewer than 20 systems (i.e., computers) are in the facility. Includes local area Networks and/or super- computing system(s) or systems processing sensitive or classified
information.

2

More than 20 but less than 50 systems (i.e., computers)
are in the facility. Does not include super-computing
system(s) or systems processing sensitive or classified information.

3

More than 20 but less than 50 systems (i.e., computers)
are in the facility. Includes local area networks and/or
super-computing system(s) or systems processing sensitive or classified information.

4

50 or more systems (i.e., computers) are in the facility or
the facility houses super-computing system(s) that is/are
processing sensitive or classified information.

5

physical security assessment methodology that are applicable and beneficial in the
development of an MI vulnerability assessment process.
NASA’s physical security methodology identified and prioritizes critical assets
that fall into one of two categorizes: human or facility. NASA’s reasoning is based
on lessons learned from terrorist attacks over the past 15 years. History has shown
that terrorists typically attack facilities that contain a high concentration of people
in one location. The NPR consists of 18 definition tables with value weights assigned
that are applied according to the given asset and range from experimental animals to
the relative value of arms, ammunitions, and explosives. Table 2.3 was developed by
NASA to assess and prioritize information system related assets.
NASA’s methodology also defines three weighting factors for the vulnerability
level of critical assets. Each factor is weighted according to its classification mapping
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in the corresponding definition tables. The three vulnerability factors include asset
accessibility, compliance with security requirements, and other physical deterrence
measures [27]. The complete process is recorded on the NASA Physical Security
Vulnerability Risk Analysis Worksheet (NASA form 1713 - provided in Appendix A).
This methodology demonstrates the usefulness of (1) determining the value of
critical assets by using weighting factors and (2) using robust definition tables in the
VA process. However, this methodology does not consider the potential impacts to
an organization resulting from exploited vulnerabilities. Understanding the potential
impact would aid information owners in determining if the vulnerability has been
reduced to an acceptable level of risk.
2.5.3.3 NIST Vulnerability Assessment Guide.

NIST’s Risk Manage-

ment Guide for Information Technology Systems (Special Publication 800-30) provides
a methodology for conducting vulnerability and impact assessments. The guides uses
a nine-step approach in three phases: identification, counter-measure evaluation, and
mitigation strategy implementation (flowchart diagram provided in Appendix B).
The NIST methodology is useful because it: (1) applies a systemic and linear
approach to the entire process, (2) qualitatively evaluates vulnerabilities, and (3)
provides a qualitative evaluation of the potential impact to the organization.
However, the NIST methodology: (1) uses broadly defined vulnerability tables
and (2) does not pair the vulnerability and impact assessment results to derive an
aggregated evaluation of the risk to an organization.
The NIST approach also includes an impact assessment component that is not
found in the 12-step or the NASA NPR 1620.
2.5.4 NIST Impact Assessment.

According the NIST guide, the first step

in performing a risk assessment is to gather specific information on three key organizational elements: (1) mission essential processes, (2) asset values, and (3) prioritized
lists of critical assets. The guide recommends two methods for collecting the informa26

Table 2.4:

NIST Impact Definition Table [11]

Magnitude of Impact

Impact Definition

High

Exercise of the vulnerability (1) may result in the
highly costly loss of major tangible assets or resources; (2) may significantly violate, harm, or impede organizations mission, reputation, or interest;
or (3) may result in human death or serious injury.

Medium

Exercise of the vulnerability (1) may result in the
costly loss of tangible assets or resources; (2) may
violate, harm, or impede an organization’s mission,
reputation, or interest; or (3) may result in human
injury.

Low

Exercise of the vulnerability (1) may result in the
loss of some tangible assets or resources or (2) may
noticeably affect an organization’s mission, reputation, or interest.

tion: (1) analyzing existing documentation and (2) determining the level of protection
required for each asset to maintain it’s desired state of Confidentiality, Integrity, and
Availability (CIA) [11].
The NIST impact assessment methodology assigns various qualitative (e.g.,
high, medium, low) impact levels based on the degradation severity of the CIA security objectives. Table 2.4 provides the impact definitions for each qualitative level’s
magnitude of impact.
The NIST methodology is the only reviewed methodology to assess the potential
impact to an organization resulting from MI activity.
The NIST impact assessment limitations include: undeveloped definition tables,
does not provide an aggregate level of risk (i.e., vulnerability and impact assessments),
and equal distribution of CIA security objective impact levels. For instance, if only
one category (i.e., confidentiality) has a high impact as a result of an MI action, the
other two CIA security objective components are arbitrary assigned high impact levels
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as well. By overstating impact levels, information owners will allocate resources in a
manner inconsistent with the level of residual risk.
2.6

Chapter Summary
This chapter reviewed previous research in threat taxonomies as well as three

risk assessment methodologies. The MI taxonomies, risk assessment methodology,
and impact assessment have been integrated in this research effort to achieve a richer
framework of MI activities. This framework provided the foundation for the development of a vulnerability assessment process that an information owner can use to
more precisely assess the composite risk to information and information systems.
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III. Methodology
This chapter outlines the methodology used to further develop an existing Insider
Threat Functional Decomposition Model (ITFDM), develop formal MI vulnerability
and impact assessment processes, and create a Decision Support System (DSS) proofof-concept tool capable of assessing insider threat composite vulnerability levels.
3.1

Problem Definition
This research addresses the two topics areas of MI vulnerability and impact

assessment. There are few vulnerability and impact models that are capable of providing information owners the capability to comprehensively assess the effectiveness
of their MI mitigation strategies.
3.1.1 Research Goals.

The three research goals include: (1) further de-

composition of an existing ITFDM; (2) development of MI-specific vulnerability and
impact assessment models; and (3) development of a DSS tool that can assess the
effectiveness of an organizations MI mitigation strategies.
3.1.2 Expected Outcomes.

It is expected that once the proof-of-concept tool

is developed, information owners will be able to more comprehensively evaluate the
effectiveness of an organization’s MI mitigation strategies. In turn, this should allow
the information owners to allocate scarce security resources more effectively when
mitigating malicious insider threat risks.
3.1.3 Methods.

First, the attack tree method was used to further decom-

pose the ITFDM. The added level of granularity was grounded on MI intentions and
associated actions.
Secondly, a content analysis of existing insider threat research was performed
to collect a variety of insider threat intentions and associated actions.
Thirdly, this research used a multi-dimensional approach to developing MIspecific vulnerability and impact assessment models. A secondary benefit of this ap29

proach is that it allows the development of a composite vulnerability risk score which
provides a more comprehensive assessment of overall risk. The multi-dimensional
approach was achieved by integrating the PDR (i.e., prevention, detection, and response) and CIA (confidentiality, integrity, and availability) elements in the vulnerability assessment process. In addition, the evaluation criteria expanded the qualitative
evaluation criteria from three to four categories and added a quantitative dimension
for further ease of evaluating risk.
Lastly, this research developed a DSS proof-of-concept tool using Microsoft 2003
Excel Spreadsheet software.
3.2

Taxonomy of the Insider Threat
ITFDM provides a novel insider threat taxonomy framework. This research

builds upon the model through further decomposition of the insider threat. The
extended ITFDM is grounded on MI intentions and their associated actions.
3.2.1 Approach.

Analysis of existing research will determine the more preva-

lent malicious actions performed by insider threats. A method that adds further
granularity to the existing insider threat taxonomy model is also developed. Once
expanded, the extended taxonomy model provides information owners with an improved framework that presents common MI actions. The extended model serves as a
foundation for the MI vulnerability assessment and impact processes developed later
in this research.
3.2.1.1 Content Analysis.

Analysis of existing insider threat research,

case studies, and surveys provided a way to determine the more prevalent malicious
actions performed by insider threats. The methodology includes analysis of a number
of sources to determine commonalties in insider threat actions that exist in the sources.
The key component of this methodology relies on the analysis of a number of recent
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sources to create a more comprehensive list of various malicious actions performed
from within an organization.
Moore’s law states that as processing power doubles every 18 months, information systems capabilities also increase [9]. Subsequently, Moore’s law implies that
new insider threat actions will continue to emerge and become easier to accomplish.
For example, “thumb drives” did not exist five years ago and therefore did not pose
a security risk. If the content analysis process accomplished today did not include
recent MI research, case studies, or survey material, thumb drives may have not have
been identified as potential method for exercising malicious actions. Primarily for
this reason, it is necessary to include recent research sources into the content analysis
process when updating the taxonomy model.
While numerous documents were examined, this research focused primarily on
the eight separate sources [3, 7, 11, 13–16, 20]. Each source were found to be both
recent and inclusive in terms of addressing malicious actions performed by MIs. The
content analysis methodology used in this research considers malicious actions as a
common occurrence when identified in two or more of the sources and where then
incorporated into the extended ITFDM.
3.2.1.2 Extending the ITFDM.

The MI actions identified in the con-

tent analysis phase were categorized according to various possible MI intentions. The
result is a more comprehensive intent-based ITFDM that lists each applicable action
under the various intentions.
Prior to determining insider threat intentions, the more prevalent MI actions
identified (Section 3.2.1.1) are categorized into the four states in the ITFDM (for
convenience, Figure 3.1 is a repeat of an earlier figure from Chapter II). Next, each
malicious action is analyzed and re-classified to determine the MI’s primary intent.
After the intention of each action has been identified, actions sharing similar MI
intentions are grouped together.
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Malicious
Insider

ACTIONS

Alteration Distribution Snooping

Figure 3.1:

Elevation

Root and 1st Tier ITFDM Action Leaf Nodes [4]

Figure 3.2 is the sixteen MI’s intentions identified in this research. Figures C.1C.4, map each malicious action to the MI’s applicable intention (located in Appendix
C).
3.2.2 Evaluation.

The intent-based ITFDM provides clarity to the model

while also enhancing the utility of the model. Emerging technologies introduce new
vulnerabilities in information systems which leads to new ways for MIs to exploit information systems. Therefore, to preserve the utility of the modified ITFDM the model
should be updated on an annual basis to ensure it contains current vulnerabilities.
While the methods to exploit vulnerabilities vary with time, MI intentions generally remain constant. For example, the added capabilities made possible through
the introduction of Universal Serial Bus (USB) ports presented MIs with new methods to exploit information systems. MIs can use thumb drive technology to copy an
organization’s critical data for malicious purposes. Determining where to place the
MI thumb drive exploit action in the now intent-based model can be performed by
mapping the malicious action to the applicable malicious intention. In this case, the
primary malicious intention that is most applicable to the malicious use of thumb
drive technology is unauthorized file distribution (located in Appendix C - Figure
C.2).
Another added benefit of classifying malicious insider actions based upon their
primary intention is that information owners now have a means of focusing on their
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Figure 3.2:

ITFDM Malicious Intentions.

primary areas of concern and associated actions. Depending on an organization’s mission and critical data, some MI intentions and associated actions are more applicable
than others. For example, a university library may not be as concerned as a military
intelligence center about the MI intention of disrupting the organization’s ability to
make informed decisions; however, the library is likely to be more concerned about
the malicious intent of disrupting network performance and reliability (located in Appendix C - Figure C.1). The improved ITFDM now allows organizations to focus on
specific MI intentions of concern and associated actions commonly used to exploit the
intentions.
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3.3

Vulnerability Assessment Process
Existing vulnerability models cannot provide information owners with an effec-

tive methodology for measuring their organization’s MI vulnerability. This research
uses a novel approach to develop an MI-specific vulnerability assessment process that
effectively measures insider threat mitigation strategies. This process also provides
greater granularity in the MI vulnerability assessment process then the NIST and
NASA approaches [11, 27]. While other vulnerability assessment methodologies use
a single definition table to classify vulnerabilities, this research uses three definition
tables. This provides a more comprehensive assessment of the effectiveness of an organization’s MI mitigation strategies than do other existing vulnerability assessment
processes.
3.3.1 Approach.

This research develops a Malicious Insider Vulnerability

Assessment (MIVA) process that measures the effectiveness of information owner’s
MI mitigation strategies and determines existing subsequent MI mitigation strategies
security levels. Once each PDR component is assessed, the combined security levels
(i.e., vulnerability levels) are categorized into an overall security level.
The MIVA process correlates higher MI security levels to lower insider threat
vulnerabilities levels; lower MI security levels correlates to higher insider threat vulnerabilities levels. Prior to developing steps that comprise the MIVA process, common
security elements are defined. The common security elements (i.e., PDR) classifications in Figure 3.3 serves as the foundation for the MIVA process.
3.3.2 Common Security Element’s Definition Tables.

Individual PDR defi-

nition tables are critical elements to determining the MI security levels in the MIVA
process. In each PDR component definition table, the key words that separate high,
medium, and low in each definition are italicized. The various definitions in each
table are carefully modified vulnerability assessment definition tables used in existing
research to specifically apply to the MI and PDR security elements [27].
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Figure 3.3:

Security Elements Security Model.

3.3.2.1 Individual PDR Definition Tables.

The first PDR definition

table for prevention classifies security levels according to MI mitigation strategy’s ability to prevent typical system users from exploiting information system vulnerabilities.
Table 3.1 defines the three prevention classifications used in this research.
The second PDR component, detection, defines security levels according to MI
mitigation strategy’s ability to detect typical system users who attempt to exploit
information system vulnerabilities. Table 3.2 defines the three detection levels.
The security levels for the last component in PDR, response, are classified according to MI mitigation strategy’s ability to respond and recover from successfully
performed MI actions. Table 3.3 defines the three response levels.
3.3.2.2 Aggregate PDR Security Level Definition Table.

Table 3.4

combines the assessed security level results and arranges them from highest to lowest
security level order from each of the PDR component tables (Tables 3.1-3.3). Again,
the key words that separates the security levels in each definition are italicized.
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Table 3.1:

Prevention Security Level Definitions

Prevention Security Level

Definition

High

Prevention policies, procedures, and preventive
controls make it highly unlikely for typical system users to exercise the malicious action. Data
encryption is utilized.

Medium

Prevention policies, procedures and preventive
controls make it unlikely for typical system users
to exercise the malicious action. Group permissions and/or access control lists (ACLs) are
utilized.

Low

Prevention policies, procedures, and preventive
controls do not prevent typical system users from
exercising the malicious action.

Table 3.2:

Detection Security Level Definitions

Detection Security Level

Definition

High

Detection measures provide near-real time to realtime discovery and notification of the attempts
by typical system users to exercise a particular
action.

Medium

Detection policies, procedures, and detection controls can likely identify a typical system user who
exercises a malicious action after the fact. Discovery after the fact prevents the user from carrying
out further malicious actions and also serves as a
deterrent to other potential MIs.

Low

Detection policies, procedures, and detection controls are inadequate to discover a given malicious
action performed by an typical system user.
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Table 3.3:

Response Security Level Definitions

Response Security Level
High

Definition
Response measures have a near-real time ability to
recover and defend critical data as well as collect
and preserve evidence. This level of response ensures the least possible amount of financial harm
and/or lost data. Response policies, procedures,
and response mechanisms can include:
• Established access to a primary and alternate Computer Incident Response Team
(CIRT)
• Forensic tools such as Encase Enterprize
Edition that can provide the CIRT immediate online ability to respond, confirm, and
contain malicious actions. Examples include:
1. Existing, tested, and continually updated data recovery and insider threat
checklists
2. Extensive critical data recovery plans
are in place and periodically tested

Medium

Response measures have a delayed ability to recover and defend critical data as well as collect
and preserve evidence. Reasons for the delays may
include:
• Lack of CIRT availability
• Ineffective forensic tools and/or inability to
fully employ forensic tools
• Infrequently tested data recovery and insider threat checklists

Low

Response measures have an ineffective ability to
recover and defend critical data. There is also an
inability to collect and preserve evidence, which
can result in the greatest possible financial and
data loss. Contingency checklists may exist but
are ineffective and likely lack frequent and/or
practical application testing.
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3.3.2.3 Classification Levels.

While each of the individual PDR com-

ponent tables contain three classification levels (high, medium, and low), the aggregated PDR security level table adds two sub-classification levels within the high
category (i.e., high and very high) to further distinguish between assessed PDR aggregated scoring. MI mitigation strategies assessed at higher security levels implies
lower MI vulnerability levels and lower value-weighting, while lower assessed security
levels implies lower MI vulnerability levels.
When one of the PDR components is assessed with a low security level, the
combined PDR security level results in a high vulnerability classification. The vulnerability to the assessed MI action increases proportionally as the security levels
of the other two PDR component levels decrease. Each decrease results in greater
vulnerability. For example, PDR assessment scores of low, low, and low represent a
greater vulnerability to MIs than PDR element scores of low, high, and high. The
PDR security level table recognizes this and accounts for the potential differences in
assessed security levels by taking the standard classification for high and subdividing
it into two categories: very high and high vulnerability.
3.3.2.4 Vulnerability Level Value Weighting.

The value weighting clas-

sification approach is a departure from methods used in other vulnerability assessment
research. Existing vulnerability assessment methods commonly define three possible
vulnerability levels and assign low levels a weighted value of 0.1, medium levels a
weighted value of 0.5, and high levels a weighted value of 1.0. This classification
level value-weighting approach adequately addresses the three possible vulnerability
assessment outcomes (high, medium, low), but does not address the ten possible vulnerability assessment outcomes of the aggregated PDR security level definitions(Table
3.4).
This research uses a novel approach to assign discrete weighted values to quaternary individual PDR security levels using the Rank Reciprocal Rule (RRR). The
RRR is a decision analysis tool that provides management with tangible values that
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are based on ordinal scales (e.g., classification levels). The RRR was found to be an
appropriate tool, as the approach provides information owners with a more straightforward means of interpreting vulnerability levels.
RRR assigns quantitative ratio values relative to qualitative classifications [34].
It is capable of describing the weighted variations between classifications rather than
assigning arbitrary values. Using this method, respondents rank attributes (i.e., category levels) can be arranged by importance from highest to lowest. Using the rank
reciprocal rule formula (3.1), the ranks are transformed into normalized weighted
values [34]
1/Rι
wi = P
.
1/Rj

(3.1)

j

where wi is the normalized weight of the i th attribute, Ri is the rank number, and
the denominator is the sum of the inverses of all ranks.
Using the classifications of high, medium, and low, the following example demonstrates a practical application of the rank reciprocal rule [34].
wι = wH =

1/1
1/1+1/2+1/3

=

1
11/6

= 0.55

wι = wM =

1/2
1/1+1/2+1/3

=

1/2
11/6

= 0.27

wι = wL =

1/3
1/1+1/2+1/3

=

1/3
11/6

= 0.18

where wH is the highest level attribute, wM is the second highest level attribute, and
wL is the lowest level attribute.
The numerical values in Table 3.4 are the result of the application of the RRR
to assign an overall quantitative value to each of the ten potential vulnerability assessment outcomes. The corresponding weighted vulnerability values increase as the
vulnerability level increases (lower assessed PDR security levels). For example, a PDR
assessment resulting in all high security levels has a lower combined vulnerability value
than would a PDR assessment resulting in all low security levels. The higher the secu-
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rity level, the lower the vulnerability level; the lower the vulnerability level, the lower
the corresponding weighted value. The RRR also accounts for vulnerabilities inherent to information systems. While small, even the lowest MI assessed vulnerability
level (all high PDR security levels) still has a weighted value (0.03) indicating that
some vulnerability exist. This is fitting as vulnerabilities are inherent to imperfect
man-made information systems and there is no method by which vulnerabilities can
be completely mitigated.
Table 3.4: Combined PDR Vulnerability Classifications Definitions with Corresponding Individual PDR Security Level Possibilities
Combined PDR Vulnerability
Classification (with Associated
Security Levels)
Very High Vulnerability
Low-Low-Low (0.34)
Low-Low-Medium (0.17)
——————————————–
High Vulnerability
Low-Low-High (0.11)
Low-Medium-Medium (0.09)
Low-Medium-High (0.07)
Low-High-High (0.06)

Definition

Policies, procedures, and preventive controls allow
typical system users to potentially carry out malicious actions. The vulnerability is unacceptable in
varying degrees due to the ineffectiveness of policies, procedures, and preventive controls to prevent,
defend, or respond to malicious insider actions.

Medium Vulnerability
Medium-Medium-Medium (0.05)
Medium-Medium-High (0.045)
Medium-High-High (0.035)

Policies, procedures, and preventive controls make
critical data exposure to potential insider threats
unlikely in varying degrees. However, should an
insider successfully carry out malicious actions detection of and response to the threat could occur
after the fact.

Low Vulnerability
High-High-High (0.03)

Policies, procedures, and preventive controls allow
for a minimal critical data exposure risk level. It is
highly unlikely that typical system users could successfully carry out malicious actions and if they did,
near to real-time detection and response measures
could identify the risk.
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3.3.2.5 Evaluation.

The PDR security level definitions offer a greater

level of robustness than existing vulnerability assessment frameworks thus allowing
for a more comprehensive insider threat vulnerability security posture. Another improvement is the development of vulnerability assessment that subdivide the high
vulnerability classification outcomes into high and very high sub-levels. The corresponding weighted values also more accurately capture the variances between vulnerability assessments outcomes.
To this point the utility of an existing ITFDM and developed granular vulnerability assessment definition tables capable of providing a comprehensive assessment
of an organization’s MI vulnerabilities has been enhanced. Both concepts are now
used to develop an MI vulnerability assessment process.
3.3.3 Malicious Insider Vulnerability Assessment (MIVA) Process.

This

section presents the assumptions, limitations, and nine steps of the MIVA process.
The expanded ITFDM and common security element (PDR) definitions provide the
framework for the development of the nine-step MIVA process table.
Assumptions.

The MIVA process assesses the effectiveness of MI mitigation

strategies that protect information owner’s critical information. Therefore, MIVA
assumes the following:
• Information owners have determined the subset of data that they deem the most
critical, and
• Existing MI mitigation strategies intended to protect the information owner’s
critical information are in place.
Limitations.

A known limitation of the MIVA process is the assignment of

quantitative values based on a qualitative assessment process (use of PDR classification definition tables). The RRR qualitative to quantitative transformation technique is intended to provide information managers a more straightforward means of
interpreting vulnerability assessment results. The problem is that information owners
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may assume that the values are quantitative when in reality they are not (calculations
based upon ordinal scaling - high, medium, and low). The potential ramifications are
not likely to be of significance due to the presentation of the quantitative values in
an ordinal-based definition table. However, if the quantitative values were presented
on their own (not in the ordinal definition table), the assessment results would likely
be misleading.
MIVA Process Table. Table 3.5 presents the nine step MIVA process using the
extended ITFDM as well as PDR definition tables. As described in the MIVA process table, every action listed under an information owner’s MI intention of concern
(identified using the ITFDM) is evaluated against the effectiveness of MI mitigation
strategies. Each action receives its own vulnerability assessment score. The intention’s vulnerability assessment score is the highest vulnerability assessment score of all
possible listed methods of exploitation (i.e., malicious actions), listed in the ITFDM.
The concept of assigning the root node (i.e., MI intention) the vulnerability value of
the leaf node (i.e, malicious action) with the highest vulnerability is based upon the
attack trees presented in Chapter II.
The first step of the MIVA process maps an organization’s MI mitigation strategies to one or more of the applicable security practice elements. Table 3.6 is an
example of the mapping of mitigation strategies to security practice elements.
Step three of the MIVA process calls for penetration testing which evaluates
the effectiveness of the mitigation strategies to defend against MIs. MI mitigation
strategies assessed as effective yield higher security levels and lower subsequent vulnerability levels whereas ineffective MI mitigation strategies yield lower security levels
and higher subsequent vulnerability levels.
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Table 3.5:
Step

Malicious Insider Vulnerability Assessment Process Steps
Description

1

Map each mitigation strategy identified to the applicable security practice
element(s) - PDR.

2

Assist the critical data stakeholder(s) in selecting intentions they perceive
as potential insider threats from the insider threat functional decomposition model (ITFDM).

3

Use the ITFDM to identify the action(s) listed under each of the intentions
identified in Step 2.

4

Using a typical system user account, attempt to exercise the first malicious action identified in Sstep 3. Based upon the ability to exercise the
action, mitigation strategies, and vulnerability definition tables determine
the given action’s PDR security level (high, medium, or low).

5

Sort (low to high) and map the PDR security levels determined in Step 4
to the PDR vulnerability classification level table. The PDR vulnerability
classification level table provides the corresponding weighted values for all
possible PDR security level combinations.

6

Enter the data from Steps 2-5 into the malicious insider vulnerability and
potential impact DSS.

7

Repeat Steps 4-6 for each action listed under the selected potential malicious insider intent identified in sStep 2.

8

The intentions resulting vulnerability security score is determined by the
applicable action assessed with the highest weighted value and corresponding weighted value.

9

Repeat Steps 4-7 for each identified potential malicious insider intent identified by critical information owners in Step 2.
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Table 3.6:
Example Mapping for Step One of the
MIVA Process
Critical Data Mitiga- Applicable Security Practices
tion Strategies
Data Recovery Plan

Response

Encrypted Files

Prevention

Auditing

Detection and Response

Virus Protection

3.3.4 Evaluation.

Prevention

The objective of the MIVA process is to provide critical

data information owners with separate vulnerability assessments for each MI intention of concern. The perceived MI intention of concern varies depending upon the
organization’s mission and type of critical data. Providing information owners with
a method of identifying applicable intentions of concern allows them to evaluate the
effectiveness of mitigation strategies for only the most threatening MI intentions and
associated actions to exploit their critical data.
3.4

Impact Assessment Process
Existing impact assessment frameworks do not provide information owners with

an effective methodology to understand of the potential effect on their organization
resulting from successfully performed MI actions [19, 27]. MI impact assessment results provide information managers with added insight on the value of their critical
data. Information managers may use the MI potential impact results to aid in the
mitigation strategy decision process.
This research uses a similar, but novel approach to develop an MI-specific impact assessment process that was used in the development of the MIVA process. The
Malicious Insider Potential Impact Assessment (MIPIA) process (Section 3.4.1) develops and uses three definition tables whose results are aggregated into an overall
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impact assessment values. The MIPIA process component tables consist of separate
CIA component tables, similar to the approach used by the National Institute of Standards Technology’s (NIST’s) information technology impact assessment model [11].
3.4.1 Approach.

This research develops a MIPIA process that measures the

potential impact of MI actions. A major variation of the MIPIA process is MIPIA
process assesses only the malicious intentions of concern (not the associated actions)
identified by information owners in the MIVA process. It is not necessary to assess
the impact of each successfully performed malicious action, because they are only
methods by which a given malicious intention can be performed. MIPIA provides
impact assessment values for each of the individual MI intentions of concern identified
by information owners (from the ITFDM).
Once each component of the CIA security objectives are assessed, the combined
impact levels (vulnerability levels) are aggregated to determine the overall impact
(illustrated in Table 3.10). Successfully realized MI intentions do not always have a
direct impact on each CIA component. Such is the case of the thumb drive example
discussed earlier using a thumb drive to download and subsequently distribute critical
data in an unauthorized manner primarily impacts the confidentiality component of
the three security objectives (CIA). In cases such as this, individual CIA components
having little or no impact on a given MI intention would be assessed a low level.
Prior to developing the steps that comprise the MIPIA process, it is first necessary to define the common security objectives. The common security objectives
classifications (CIA), depicted in Figure 3.4, are the foundation for the MIPIA process.
3.4.2 Common Security Objective Definition Tables.

Similar to the NIST’s

impact assessment framework, an MI-specific impact assessment methodology using
the CIA security objectives is used [11]. Individual CIA definition tables are critical
elements in determining the MI impact levels in the MIPIA process. In each of CIA
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Figure 3.4:

Security Objectives Impact Model.

component definition tables, the key words that separate high, medium, and low
in each definition are italicized. The various definitions in each table are carefully
modified impact assessment definition tables, used in existing research, to apply to
the MI and CIA security objectives [11].
3.4.2.1 Individual CIA Definition Tables.

The first CIA component,

confidentiality, classifies impact levels according to the impact of successful MI actions
have in the unauthorized access of critical data. Table 3.7 defines the three confidential
classifications.
The second CIA component, integrity, classifies impact levels of successful MI
actions that result in compromised and subsequently unreliable critical data. Table
3.8 defines the three integrity classifications.
The security levels for the last component in CIA, availability, are classified
according to the impact of successful MI actions that cause critical data to be unavailable. Table 3.9 defines the three integrity classifications.
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Table 3.7:

Confidentiality Impact Level Definitions

Confidentiality Impact Level

Definition

High

Unauthorized access to critical data could result
in unrecoverable financial losses, destroyed reputation, lost customers, or a major threat to national
security.

Medium

Unauthorized access to critical data could result
in significant financial losses, damaged reputation, lowered customer confidence, or a threat to
national security.

Low

Unauthorized access to critical data could result
in minor financial losses, slightly tarnished reputation, or threat to national security.

Table 3.8:

Integrity Impact Level Definitions

Integrity Impact Level

Definition

High

Unreliable critical data, due to a malicious insider
compromise, could result in unrecoverable financial losses, inability to accomplish essential missions, loss of life, or a major threat to national
security.

Medium

Unreliable critical data, due to a malicious insider
compromise, could result in significant financial
losses, hindered ability to accomplish missions or
tasks, or a threat to national security.

Low

Unreliable critical data, due to a malicious insider compromise, could result a minor hindrance
to mission accomplishment or threat to national
security.
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Table 3.9:

Availability Impact Level Definitions

Availability Impact Level

Definition

High

Unavailable data could result in substantial financial losses, inability to accomplish essential missions, tarnished reputation, loss of life, or a major
threat to national security.

Medium

Unavailable data could result in significant financial losses, hindered ability to accomplish missions or tasks, loss of life, or a threat to national
security.

Low

Unavailable data could result in minor financial
losses and/or customer annoyance, or threat to
national security.

3.4.2.2 Aggregate PDR Security Level Definition Table.

Table 3.10

aggregates the assessed security level results in order from lowest to highest potential
impact level for each of the CIA component tables (Tables 3.7-3.9). Again, the key
words that separate the impact levels in each definition are italicized.
3.4.2.3 Classification Levels.

Similar to the MIVA process, the aggre-

gated CIA security level table includes two sub-classification levels within the high
category (i.e,. high and very high), in order to provide further distinction between
assessed CIA aggregated scoring. Higher assessed CIA component potential impacts
from successfully realized MI intentions result in a higher potential impact in the
combined CIA definition table.
3.4.2.4 Vulnerability Level Value Weighting.

The MIPIA process

applies the same value weighting principles discussed earlier in the MIVA process
(3.3.2.4). The MIPIA aggregated CIA table (Table 3.10) contains ten possible outcomes. The CIA table uses the same rank reciprocal rule approach, presented in the
MIVA process, to assign discrete weighted values to individual CIA security levels. It
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can be seen in Table 3.10 that corresponding weighted vulnerability values increase
as the impact levels increase.
Table 3.10: Combined CIA Impact Classifications Definitions with Corresponding
Individual CIA Vulnerability Level Possibilities
Potential Impact Level
Very High Impact
High-High-High (0.34)
High-High-Medium (0.17)
——————————————–
High Impact
High-High-Low (0.11)
High-Medium-Medium (0.09)
High-Medium-Low (0.07)
High-Low-Low (0.06)

Impact Definitions
The potential impact of malicious insider actions to
critical data, when measured against the three common information assurance classifications, could be
detrimental in varying degrees within this category
in terms of financial losses, inability to accomplish
essential missions, loss of life, or a major threat to
national security.

Medium Impact
Medium-Medium-Medium (0.05)
Medium-Medium-Low (0.045)
Medium-Low-Low (0.035)

The potential impact of potential malicious insider
actions to critical data, when measured against
the three common information assurance classifications, could be significant in varying degrees within
this category in terms of financial losses, hindered
ability to accomplish missions or tasks, or a threat
to national security.

Low Impact
Low-Low-Low (0.03)

The potential impact of potential malicious insider
actions to critical data, when measured against
the three common information assurance classifications, could be minimal within this category in
terms of financial losses, hindered ability to accomplish missions or tasks, or a threat to national
security.

3.4.2.5 Evaluation.

The CIA impact level definition table have a

greater level of robustness than existing impact assessment frameworks thus allowing
for a more comprehensive insider threat potential impact assessment. The development of the CIA definition tables used many of the same approaches as PDR definition
tables. The major differences between the PDR and CIA definitions is PDR definitions
are based on common security elements that assess the effectiveness of MI mitigation
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strategies, while the CIA definitions are based on common security objectives that
assess the potential impact of MI realized malicious intentions.
The following four-step MIPIA process uses the component table and aggravated
CIA definitions to determine the potential impact on a given organization for each
of the same malicious intentions of concern identified by information owners in the
MIVA process.
3.4.3 Malicious Insider Potential Impact Assessment (MIPIA) Process.
This section presents the assumptions, limitations, and four steps of the MIPIA process.
Assumptions.

The MIPIA process assesses the impact of realized malicious

intentions. Therefore, MIPIA assumes:
• The organization has previously performed a MIVA
• The MIPIA process assesses the same malicious intentions of concern identified
during the given organization’s MIVA
• Each of the assessed malicious intentions of concern can be successfully realized
(one or more possible action can be performed)
Limitations.

As with the MIVA process, the MIPIA process assigns quanti-

tative values to a qualitative assessment process (use of CIA classification definition
tables). While based on a qualitative process, quantitative values provide information
owners with a more tangible means of determining the potential impacts of successfully realized MI intentions as opposed to those that qualitative classifications results
can provide.
MIPIA Process Table.

Table 3.11 presents the four-step MIPIA process that

assesses he malicious intentions of concern identified in the MIVA process. Each
malicious intention of concern receives its own vulnerability assessment score.
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Table 3.11:

Malicious Insider Potential Impact Assessment Process Steps

Step

Description

1

Take the first intention identified in the MIVA process and use the security
objectives description tables to classify the potential impact on confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA) operating under the assumption
that one or more of the actions within the malicious intention can be successfully performed.

2

Sort (high to low) and map the CIA potential impact levels determined
in Step 1 to the CIA potential impact table. The CIA potential impact
classification level table provides the corresponding weighted values for all
possible CIA impact level combinations.

3

Enter the results from Steps 1 and 2 into Decision Support System (DSS).

4

Repeat Steps 1-3 for each malicious intention of concern evaluated in the
MIVA process.
3.4.4 Evaluation.

The objective of the MIPIA process is to provide critical

information owners with separate impact assessments for each MI intention that poses
a threat to their critical data. The MIPIA process results also provide information
managers with added insight to value of their critical data.
3.5

Malicious Insider Composite Vulnerability
Once an organization performs the MIVA and MIPIA processes, the results can

be fused to provide a composite vulnerability assessment for each MI intention of
concern. The composite vulnerability MI intention assessment serves as a valuable
data point in the data mitigation strategy decision process.
3.5.1 Composite Vulnerability Matrix.

Figure 3.5 provides information own-

ers with critical information composite MI vulnerability levels. The table determines
the composite MI vulnerability for each malicious intention based upon the given
intention’s assessed vulnerability and impact classification levels intersection.
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Figure 3.5:

Composite Vulnerability Matrix.

A vulnerability assessment level of very high paired with a potential impact assessment level of low results in an overall composite vulnerability of low (information
owners may likely assume the given intentions composite vulnerability). A vulnerability assessment level of medium paired with a potential impact level of results in
an overall high composite vulnerability of very high. In this case, information owners may likely choose not to accept the risk and add additional mitigation strategies
to lower the vulnerability level and subsequent composite vulnerability classification
level.
3.5.2 Evaluation.

Composite MI vulnerability levels, as determined in the

Figure 3.5, enable information owners to understand their vulnerability and potential
impact levels for each MI intention. Information owners may add mitigation strategies
as needed to lower the overall vulnerability. Composite vulnerability levels can be reassessed after MI mitigation strategies are added. Providing that information owners
select effective additional MI mitigation strategies to protect against a given malicious
intention, the intentions composite vulnerability classification levels should decrease
when reassessed.
3.6

Decision Support System
This section discuses a MI Decision Support System (DSS) that captures the

output from this research’s proposed vulnerability and impact assessment method52

ology and provides information owners with insider threat composite vulnerability
levels.
3.6.1 Background.

A DSS is, “a computer-based system that aids the

process of decision-making” [12]. DSSs can be either active, passive, or cooperative
[17,26]. The passive form of DSS is used to demonstrate the usefulness of the proposed
concept. While active DSSs provide decision suggestions, passive based DSS’s do not.
However, passive DSS’s still provide information owners with insight for the decision
analysis process.
3.6.2 Approach.

The proof-of-concept tool was developed with Microsoft

Excel 2003. The primary purpose of developing the tool was to provide a simple MI
critical information assessment tool that incorporates extended ITFDM, MI vulnerability, and MI composite vulnerability assessments.
3.6.3 Individual MI Intentions Assessment Worksheets.

The DSS tool began

with a single MI Excel worksheet based upon one of the sixteen common MI intentions
(originating from the extended ITFDM). Upon final development of the worksheet,
fifteen additional copies are to be made from the original MI intention worksheet (to
capture all sixteen malicious intentions from the ITFDM). The intention header and
corresponding methods of exploitation (applicable actions listed in the ITFDM) are
modified accordingly.
3.6.3.1 Graphical User Interface and Functionality.

The Graphical

User Interface (GUI) of the malicious intention worksheet incorporates malicious intention and associated actions as well as MI vulnerability, impact, and composite vulnerability assessment. Figure 3.6 is a screenshot of the disrupt network performance
and reliability worksheet that resides within the tool. To demonstrate the working
application of the tool, the PDR and CIA dropdown boxes are populated with ran-
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Figure 3.6:

Proof-of-Concept Tool MI Intention Screenshot

dom assessment values (High, Medium, or Low). Table 3.12 provides descriptions of
the functionality for the MI intention worksheet depicted in Figure 3.6.
3.6.4 Assessment Summary Worksheet.

The MI summary worksheet is a

single Excel worksheet that summarizes the vulnerability results from each of the
completed intentions worksheets. The summary worksheet is an inclusive view of
existing MI composite vulnerability levels and also provides the added capability to
drill down to the individual worksheets that populate the summary worksheet.
3.6.4.1 GUI and Functionality.

Figure 3.7 is a screen shot of the tools

MI summary intention worksheet. The assessment values (overall impact, vulnerability, and composite vulnerability) have been populated with the disrupt network
performance and reliability worksheet’s completed MI vulnerability and impact assessments. The following list (A-C) explains the GUI and functionality of the MI
intention worksheet in Figure 3.7.
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Table 3.12:

DSS Tool’s Intention Worksheet Component Descriptions

Figure Placement

Function

A

malicious intention (from ITFDM)

B

applicable methods (actions from ITFDM)

C

PDR component hyperlinks (to applicable MIVA definition
tables

D

self populating MIVA process corresponding classification and
weighted values (non-editable)

E

drop-down list boxes (High, Medium, Low)

F

CIA component hyperlinks (to applicable MIPIA definition
tables)

G

drop-down list box’s (High, Medium, Low)

H

self populating MIPIA process corresponding classification and
weighted values (non-editable)

I

self populating composite vulnerability classification

J

composite vulnerability evaluation matrix legend

K

vulnerability assessment summary worksheet hyperlink

A - organization’s and assessor’s information
B - hyperlinks to the sixteen common MI individual intention’s vulnerability and
impact assessment worksheets (from ITFDM)
C - directly populated from each of the completed MI intention worksheets
The organization and assessor information at the top of the form is the only
editable portion of the form. Each of the listed MI intentions (from ITFDM) are
hyperlinks that enable users to go to any one of the sixteen individual malicious
intention worksheets.
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Figure 3.7:

Proof of Concept Tool MI Summary Screenshot

3.6.5 MIVA and MIPIA Process Verification.

The purpose of this sec-

tion is to verify that the MIVA and MIPIA processes as well as the proof-of-concept
tool’s automated calculations perform as intended. Adding additional MI mitigation
strategies should result in a reduction in a previously assessed MI intention’s vulnerability classification level. The MI intention’s composite vulnerability classification
(composite vulnerability matrix) should also be reduced.
The MI composite vulnerability classification level for a given intention is derived
from the MIVA process (malicious action with highest vulnerability) and the MIPIA
process (impact of exercised MI intentions). While an organization can not lower
the potential impact without reducing current capabilities, MI intention’s composite
vulnerability classification levels can be reduced by decreasing MI vulnerability levels
(PDR) assessed in the MIVA process.
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Figure 3.8:

Vulnerability Assessment and Tool Verification

Suppose the assessed organization in Figure 3.6 added additional MI mitigation strategies. The additional mitigation strategies provide real-time detection for
each malicious method listed whose intentions are to disrupt network reliability and
performance. Real-time detection would result in the re-categorization of actions’
detection levels to high and subsequently lower vulnerability levels and associated
weighted values for each action.
As previously noted, the method with the highest vulnerability is used to calculate the composite MI vulnerability level for the given intention. Adding real-time
detection measures would lower each vulnerability level and subsequently passes a
lower vulnerability classification level into the composite vulnerability matrix (Figure
3.8). In this case, the malicious intention’s composite vulnerability is reduced from
very high (Figure 3.6) to high (Figure 3.8), thereby verifying that the MIVIA and
MIPA processes perform as intended. The proof-of-concept tool’s classification and
weighted value calculations also functioned as intended.
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3.6.6 Tool Evaluation.

The tool provides a computer-based method to per-

form composite vulnerability assessments. The tool does not provide suggested mitigation strategies to reduce MI intention vulnerability levels and subsequent composite
vulnerability assessment levels.
However, the tool does a computer-based application that evaluates the effectiveness of MI mitigation strategies (assessed in the MIVA process). The tool also
helps information owners understand the potential impacts of successful MI actions
(assessed in the MIPIA process). Ultimately, critical information owners can use
the composite vulnerability assessment results to assist in the MI mitigation strategy
decision process.
The Composite Vulnerability Process Model (Figure 3.9) is a visual representation of the fundamental research methods developed in this research that are used to
determine an organization’s MI composite vulnerability levels.
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Figure 3.9:

Vulnerability Assessment Process Model
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3.7

Chapter Summary
This chapter discussed the fundamental concepts of this research including:

(1) further decomposition of an existing insider threat model using malicious insider
intentions and their associated actions; (2) content analysis of existing insider threat
research to collect a variety of insider threat intentions and associated actions; (3) use
of a multi-dimensional approach to develop malicious insider specific vulnerability and
impact assessment process models; and (4) development of an DSS tool that serves
as a working application of the fundamental concepts presented in this research. The
next chapter contains a practical example that demonstrates the application of the
concepts embodied in this research.
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IV. Notional Example
This chapter presents a notional example to demonstrate the application of the concepts presented in this research to include: (1) the intent ITFDM, (2) MI composite
vulnerability assessment process model, and (3) DSS tool.
4.1

Notional Example
To exercise the concepts proposed in this research and understand their poten-

tial, a notional example is developed. A generic organization is defined to demonstrate
the wide applicability of the methodologies without limiting them to any one type of
organization (e.g., commercial sector or Department of Defense).
4.1.1 Definitions.

It will be beneficial to revisit key concepts that are used

in the notional example.
• Malicious Insider (MI). Trusted users who intentionally use authorized information system access to perform unauthorized activities.
• Organization. Entities that share a common function and objective (e.g., finance, personnel office, intelligence office, registers office).
• Typical system user. Non-technical users who are trusted, possess authorized
access to the system, but do not have administrator privileges.
• Information owner. System users who are, “... responsible for ensuring that
proper controls are in place to address integrity, confidentiality, and availability
of the IT systems and data they own” [11].
• Critical data. Data that has the greatest value to the information owners such
as intellectual property, client information, and classified material. The greatest
harm to the organization would occur if critical information is compromised.
• Insider Threat Functional Decomposition Model (ITFDM).) Definable taxonomy that systematically decomposes malicious insiders according to known MI
intentions and associated actions.
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Assumptions:
1. Critical data subset has been recently
determined by information owners
2. Existing MI mitigation strategies are in place

Step 9 – Repeat Steps 4-7 for each
intention identified in Step 2

Step 1 –Map existing MI
mitigation strategies to PDR
mapping

Step 8 - Determine intention’s
overall vulnerability security level

Step 2 – Using ITFDM,
identify intentions that
threaten to critical data

Step 7 - Repeat Steps 4-6 for
each action identified in Step 3

Step 6 –Enter data from Steps 25 into Microsoft Excel inactive
ITDSS

Step 3 –Identify actions
listed under each intention
identified in Step 2

Step 5 – Determine
vulnerability score for the
action in Step 4

Figure 4.1:

Step 4 – Map 1st action
from Step 3 and determine
its PDR security levels

MI Vulnerability Assessment Process Model.

• Malicious Insider Vulnerability Assessment (MIVA). Nine-step process that
measures the effectiveness of an organization’s MI mitigation strategies and
subsequent insider threat vulnerability levels. Figure 4.1 graphically illustrates
the process.
• Malicious Insider Potential Impact Assessment (MIPIA). Four-step process that
analyzes the potential impact should MIs successfully exploit the organizations
critical data. Figure 4.2 presents a graphical representation to illustrate the
process.
• Composite Vulnerability. Determined by the combined MIVA and MIPIA process assessed results. Assessed composite vulnerability levels provide information owners with an organizations overall MI risk level for each malicious intention of concern.
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Assumptions:
1. MIVA has been accomplished
2. MIPIA process accesses the same malicious
intentions of concern identified in the MIVA
process
3. One or more actions within each intention of
concern can be successfully exercised

Step 4 –Repeat steps 1-3 for
each intention of concern
identified in the MIVA process

Step 1 –Classify the
confidentiality, integrity and
availability of the 1st intention
according to the CIA tables

Step 2 – Determine the 1st
intentions potential impact level
and weighted value

Step 3 – Enter the results
from step 1 and 2 into the
MS Excel inactive ITDSS

Figure 4.2:
4.2

MI Potential Impact Assessment Process Model.

Notional Example Problem Definition
Suppose an organization must secure client accounts and personal information

has requested an MI composite vulnerability assessment. The organization’s objective
is to assess the effectiveness of existing MI mitigation strategies and to obtain composite vulnerability assessment measurements they can use in the MI risk mitigation
decision process. The following sections demonstrate the application of the processes
developed in Chapter III.
4.2.1 Pre-Assessment Data Collection.

The MIVA process needs two pieces

of information prior to its use. First, information owners must have recently identified
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the subset of data that they deem most critical. Secondly, they must also identify
candidate MI mitigation strategies to protect that critical information.
• Critical data. The organization identifies customer account numbers as well as
personal data that could identify customers and employees as the organization’s
most critical data. Compromise of either of two sets of critical data would cause
the greatest amount of harm to the organization.
• Mitigation strategies. Table 4.1 lists the MI mitigation strategies to protect the
organization’s critical data along with a brief explanation of each strategy.
4.2.2 MIVA.

The MIVA process is to be performed independently for

the various MI intentions of concern identified by information owners. However, for
the sake of brevity, the vulnerability assessment methodologies can be sufficiently
demonstrated by performing a composite vulnerability assessment using only one of
the malicious intentions of concern identified by critical information owners.
4.2.2.1 Application of the MIVA Process.

Since the organization re-

questing a composite vulnerability assessment has identified its most critical data
as well as the mitigation strategies that are available to protect the critical data, the
composite vulnerability assessment methodology can begin. The MIVA process is performed first to determine the effectiveness of the mitigation strategies and subsequent
vulnerability levels.
Step 1. The first step maps each of the organizations mitigation strategies to the
applicable security practice element (prevention, detection, and/or response - PDR).
Table 4.1 is the mapping of the organization’s mitigation strategies to the applicable
PDR component.
Upon initial review of the organization’s mitigation strategies in Table 4.1, it
appears that the organization is focused primarily on protecting critical data through
preventive measures. The organization lacks robustness in detection and response
measures. However, the quantity of MI PDR component mitigation methods does not
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Table 4.1:

Notional Example: Mitigation Strategies to PDR Mapping

Mitigation Strategy

Description

Security Element

Privacy Act Training

Annual training to familiarize system
users with the proper handling of client
and employee information

Prevention

Virus Protection

Organization-wide virus protection with Prevention
automated updates to protect against
emerging threats

Strong Passwords

Since insiders are already potentially Prevention
aware of the information system’s username conventions, the use of strong
passwords make it more difficult for
other users to obtain another user’s
password

Physical Access Controls Cipher lock system in place to access
server room

Prevention

Audit Trail

Critical data and system access logging

Detection

Data Backups

Nightly, weekly, and monthly critical
data backups

Response

Recovery Plan

Recovery document (not routinely Response
tested) that focuses on the recovery of
critical data and servers

necessarily indicate the level of robustness that each common security element (PDR)
provides against insider threats. The MIVA process will now assess the effectiveness
of each mitigation strategy.
Step 2. In the second step, critical data information owners identify (using the
ITFDM) malicious insider intentions that pose the greatest risk to the organization’s
critical information. In this example, critical information owners have identified the
following malicious intentions as most threatening to the organization’s critical information:
• Destruction of critical data
• Unauthorized file distribution
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• Unauthorized file access
• Unauthorized system user activity monitoring
Normally, the remaining seven steps in the model would be repeated independently for each of the malicious intentions of concern identified. Each malicious
intention of concern would receive independent MI vulnerability, potential impact,
and composite vulnerability assessment levels. However, the methodology is amply
demonstrated using one of the above malicious intentions of concern. For the sake
of brevity, this notional example will proceed by performing the MIVA and MIPIA
process using one of the organization’s MI intentions of concern: unauthorized system
user activity monitoring.
Step 3. The third step uses ITFDM to identify and list malicious actions for the
applicable malicious intention of concern in Step 1. The following malicious actions
apply to the malicious intention of unauthorized system user activity monitoring:
• Install spyware
• Install a sniffer
• Install a keystroke logger
• Install surveillance software
Step 4. Steps four through six are repeated for each of the malicious actions
from Step three. Step four attempts to perform the first malicious action using a
typical user network account. PDR security levels are then determined by combining
the ability or inability to accomplish the malicious action and each of the component
PDR definition tables. The three PDR component tables are found in Tables 3.1, 3.2,
and 3.3. Normally, each malicious action would be independently assessed (Steps 4-6),
however, the malicious actions provided in Step three will be assessed simultaneously.
The assessed PDR levels are:
Assessed Prevention Security Level. Mitigation strategies do not prevent insiders with typical user accounts from installing spyware, sniffers, keystroke loggers, or
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surveillance software. Mapping these results to the prevention security table (Table
3.1) results in an assessed prevention security level of low. The organization needs additional mitigation strategies to prevent system users from performing unauthorized
computer installations.
Assessed Detection Security Level. Mitigation strategies cannot detect insiders
with a system user account who install unauthorized system monitoring software until
after the malicious action has been performed. Mapping these results to the detection
security table (Table 3.2) results in an assessed detection security level of medium.
While the organization uses log files to detect a MI after the malicious action has been
performed, the organization should consider implementing more robust MI detection
methods for near real-time detection of MI exploit actions.
Assessed Response Security Level. The organization’s primary means of responding to successful MI actions as defined in Table 4.1 is the use of routine data
backups and recovery plans. However, the organization did not indicate the data
backups are stored offsite, which means the backup tapes vulnerable to MI theft. The
organization also did not indicate that the critical data and system recovery plans
were routinely tested, verified, and updated. Mapping these results to the response
security table (Table 3.3) results in an assessed detection security level of medium.
Step 5. This step determines each action’s composite PDR classifications and
corresponding weighted values. Due to the DSS tool in Step 6, this step can be
omitted. The tool automates the production of composite PDR vulnerability results.
In absence of the tool, this step would be manually determined (demonstrated later).
Step 6. In this step, the output from Steps 2-5 are entered into the DSS tool.
Figure 4.3 illustrates the results from the vulnerability assessment portion of the tool,
for individual and composite PDR levels as well as the corresponding weighted values
for each malicious action. In most cases, it is unlikely each malicious action listed
for a given malicious intention of concern would receive identical PDR assessment
classification levels and subsequent composite PDR security levels. Like security level
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Figure 4.3: Notional Example: Vulnerability Assessment Results Screenshot
results for each of the four malicious actions in this notional example were primarily
due to the similar method (unauthorized installations) used by each action to perform
unauthorized system user activity monitoring.
In the absence of the DSS tool, the malicious intention’s vulnerability level
would be determined manually (Step 5 of the MIVA process). Figure 4.3 shows the
process.
1. For each malicious action sort (low to high) their assessed PDR security levels
2. Map the sorted security levels (in the notional example low, medium, and
medium) to the corresponding security levels in Table 3.4
3. Once the security levels are mapped, Table 3.4 provides the malicious action’s
MI vulnerability classification level and associated weighted value.
In the case of this notional example, mapping the PDR security levels of low,
medium, and medium to Table 3.4 results in each action’s vulnerability classification
levels being assessed as high with a weighted value of 0.09 (since they all have the
same assessed PDR security levels) .
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The manual mapping of the notional example’s MI security levels to Table 3.4
derived the same results as the DSS tool did. The like results for the manual method
and automated method (MI proof-of-concept tool) of determining each malicious action’s vulnerability levels and corresponding weighted values verify the correctness of
the tool.
Steps 7-9. Steps 7-9 repeat Steps 4-8 (determine vulnerability levels) for each
malicious intention of concern identified by critical data information owners in Step
1. Again, for practical purposes this notional example used just one of the malicious
intentions of concern identified in Step 1 to demonstrate the methodology.
MIVA Results. Performing the MIVA process provides security level assessments
for each malicious action. Higher security levels correlate to lower MI vulnerability
levels, while lower security levels equate to higher MI vulnerability levels. Each action’s associated malicious intention, provided by ITFDM, is assessed at the same
vulnerability level as the action with greatest assessed vulnerability.
In this example, every associated action of the malicious intention of unauthorized system user activity monitoring were assessed simultaneously to determine
vulnerability levels. Therefore, the malicious intention’s vulnerability level (Figure
4.3) is assessed at high with a corresponding weighted value of 0.09. The malicious
intention’s vulnerability level is one of the two components that determine the malicious intention’s composite vulnerability level.
4.2.3 MIPIA.

Like the MIVA process, the MIPIA process performed inde-

pendently for each of the various MI intentions of concern identified by information
owners. For practical purposes, this notional example demonstrates the application
of the MIPIA process by using the same malicious intention of concern (unauthorized
system user activity monitoring) assessed in the MIVA process.
4.2.3.1 Application of the MIPIA Process.

The MIVA process as-

sesses each individual method (i.e., action) of exercising a given malicious intention,
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the MIPIA process only assesses malicious intentions. The MIPIA process provides
information owners with the adverse impacts resulting from an MI successfully achieving their malicious intentions.
At this juncture, it is beneficial to review the step prior to the application of
the MIPIA process:
• The given organization has previously performed a MIVA
• The MIPIA process assesses the same malicious intentions of concern identified
during the given organization’s MIVA
• Each of the assessed malicious intentions of concern can be successfully realized
(one or more possible action can be performed)
Step 1. The first step identifies each malicious intention’s impact on each of the
common security objectives (confidentiality, integrity, and availability - CIA) when
an MI successfully achieves their malicious intention. Mapping each given malicious
intention to the applicable classification levels defined in Tables 3.7, 3.8, and 3.9
provides potential impact levels for each CIA component.
Each malicious intention’s overall potential impact is determined by aggregating
the CIA component assessment results. The overall impact classification levels and
corresponding weighted values are provided in Table 3.10. The malicious intentions
overall impact classification level is derived automatically after each assessed CIA
component’s assessed classification levels are entered into the DSS tool. The tool’s
calculations are also based upon Table 3.10. A manual calculation of the malicious
intent’s overall impact is demonstrated later.
Proceeding with the notional example, CIA component potential impact assessments for the malicious intent of unauthorized system user activity monitoring are
assessed as follows:
Assessed Confidentiality Impact Level. Of the three CIA components, confidentiality would be most adversely impacted if MIs were to install activity monitoring
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software such as keyloggers, sniffers, spyware, and other types of malicious software.
Critical information could be completely compromised, which when mapped to the
confidentiality definition table (Table 3.7), receives a potential impact level of high.
Assessed Integrity Impact Level. The malicious intention of unauthorized system
user activity monitoring would not have a direct impact on the integrity of critical
information. When mapped to the integrity definition table (Table 3.8), the malicious
intention’s integrity potential impact level to critical information is assessed as low.
Assessed Availability Impact Level. The malicious intention of unauthorized
system user activity monitoring would also not have a direct impact on the availability
of critical information. When mapped to the integrity definition table (Table 3.9),
the malicious intention’s availability potential impact level to critical information is
assessed as low.
Confidentiality is the primary common security object (CIA) component impacted should an MI achieve the malicious intention of unauthorized system user
activity monitoring. The confidentiality definition in Table 3.7 provides information
owners insight to the potentially adverse impacts associated with an MI successfully
installing unauthorized system user monitoring tools on organizational computers.
Information owners can use the assessment results when determining which risk mitigation strategy to select to achieve an acceptable level of risk.
Step 2. This step determines each action’s composite CIA classification levels
and corresponding weighted values. Due to the use of the DSS tool in step 3, this
step can be omitted. The tool determines composite CIA potential impact levels. In
the absence of the tool, this step would be required (performed later in this section).
Step 3. This step enters the output from Step 1 into the MI DSS tool. Figure
4.4 illustrates the results from the potential impact assessment portion of the tool for
individual and composite CIA levels as well as the corresponding weighted values for
each malicious action.
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Figure 4.4: Notional Example: Potential Impact Assessment
Results Screenshot
In the absence of the tool, the malicious intention’s impact level would be determined manually (Step 2 of the MIPIA process). The following enumerated list
manually calculated the assessed impact classification levels in this notional example:
1. For each malicious action sort (high to low) assessed impact levels
2. Map the sorted impact levels (high, low, and low) to the corresponding impact
levels in Table 3.10
3. Once the impact levels have been mapped, Table 3.10 provides the malicious
action’s aggregated MI impact classification level and associated weighted value.
Mapping the CIA impact levels of high, low, and low to Table 3.10 results in
each action’s impact classification levels being assessed as high with a weighted value
of 0.06.
The manual mapping of the notional example’s MI impact classification levels
to Table 3.10 derived the same results as the DSS tool and also verifies that the tool’s
calculations are correct.
Step 4. Step 4 repeats Steps 1-3 for each malicious intention of concern identified by the organization’s information owners in Step 2 of the MIVA process. For
practical purposes this notional example demonstrates the working application of the
methodologies using one malicious intention of concern, thus satisfying Step 4.
MIPIA Results. The notional example demonstrated that MI actions do not
necessarily impact each individual CIA component in the same manner (i.e, different
classification levels). The individual CIA component definition tables (Tables 3.7,
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Figure 4.5:
Screenshot

Notional Example:

Composite Vulnerability

3.9, and 3.8) provide the necessary granularity to account for the possible assessed
between the CIA components.
The malicious intention’s aggregated CIA component potential impact levels
were assessed at high with a corresponding weighted value of 0.06. The malicious
intention’s potential impact level is the second of the two elements that determine
the malicious intention’s composite vulnerability level.
4.2.4 Composite Vulnerability.

Having performed the MIVA and MIPIA

assessments for the information owner’s MI intention of concern, unauthorized system
user activity monitoring, the malicious intention’s overall composite vulnerability level
can be determined.
The MIVA process classifies the malicious intention as having a high vulnerability level. The MIPIA process then classified the malicious intention as having a
high potential impact level. Mapping the vulnerability and potential impact assessment classification levels to the composite vulnerability matrix results in the malicious
intention having a composite vulnerability classification level of high. Figure 4.5 illustrates the automated results from the composite vulnerability portion of the DSS tool.
The organization is highly vulnerable to the information owner’s concern of unauthorized system user activity monitoring and additional PDR mitigation strategies are
necessary to lower the malicious intention’s composite vulnerability classification level.
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4.2.5 Vulnerability Assessment Verification.

The section adds additional

mitigation strategies to the malicious intention from the notional example and reassesses the malicious intentions vulnerability and subsequent composite vulnerability
classification levels. It is expected that the malicious intention’s vulnerability and
subsequent composite vulnerability classification levels will decrease. Continued use of
the MI DSS tool also provides a method to verify that the tool’s formulas calculate as
intended. This section will discuss only the MIVA steps affected by the re-assessment.
Table 4.2:
Mitigation Strategy
Group Policy

Notional Example: Additional Mitigation Strategies
Description
Implement system user group policy
that prevents system users from installing software on organizational computers

Commercial Software Implement commercial software that
prevents and detects users from installing software on organizational computers

Applicable Security Element
Prevention

Prevention and Detection

Upon review of the organization’s mitigation strategies it is determined that
the additional mitigation strategies in Table 4.2 would likely decrease the malicious
intention’s vulnerability classification levels:
The recommended additional MI mitigation strategies in Table 4.2 provide specific prevention and detection methods to decrease the vulnerability classification levels of the malicious intention of concern assessed in the example. Implementing group
policies alone would provide a low cost means of improving security levels and subsequently lowering the malicious intention’s vulnerability classification levels. However,
commercial software can prevent typical users from installing software on organizational computers and also notifies information owners of typical users who attempt
to install software (e.g., Watchdog). The combination of both of the two recommended additional mitigation strategies provides a layered approach that specifically
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addresses the information owner’s concern of unauthorized system user activity monitoring. Typical system user’s would be unable to perform software installations.
Assume the organization agreed and implemented the two recommended mitigation strategies. The recommended additional mitigation strategies apply to the
prevention and detection security components which require repeating Steps 3-6 in
the MIVA process to determine the new vulnerability classification levels.
4.2.5.1 Notional Example Vulnerability Re-Assessment.

Mitigation

strategies make it highly unlikely that users can perform installations on organizational computers. Mapping these results to the prevention security table returns a
re-assessed prevention security level of high.
Re-Assessed Detection Security Level. Mitigation strategies now provide near
real-time discovery of users attempting to perform installations on organizational
computers. The commercial application’s ability to detect typical system users who
attempt to install software on organizational computers, coupled with existing audit
trail capabilities, provide a layered approach to detecting typical system users attempting to circumvent security measures. Mapping these results to the detection
security table results in a re-assessed detection security level of high.
Re-Assessment Results. Figure 4.6 shows the new vulnerability and composite vulnerability classification levels determined in the MIVA process during the reassessment. Implementing the two additional mitigation strategies resulted in the
malicious intention’s vulnerability classification level decreasing from high in Figure
4.3 to medium in Figure 4.6. The decrease in the malicious intention’s vulnerability
level was a direct result of the organization implementing the two additional mitigation strategies. The malicious intention’s composite vulnerability classification level
decreased from high in Figure 4.5 to medium in Figure 4.6.
As intended, the additional mitigation strategies in the notional example resulted in the increased security classification levels for the prevention and detection
components of the common security elements. As a direct result of the improved
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Figure 4.6:
sheet

Notional Example: Re-Assessed Individual Work-

security PDR classification levels, the organization’s vulnerability to the malicious
intention of concern decreased as did the composite vulnerability. Figure 4.7 demonstrates the working summary MI worksheet from the DSS tool as applicable to this
example. The tool performed as expected.
4.3

Chapter Summary
This chapter provides a notional example that demonstrates the fundamental

concepts presented in this research. A generic organization’s MI mitigation strategies
are assessed using the MIVA process to determine the organization’s vulnerability
classification levels for a malicious intention of concern. The MIPIA process is per75

Figure 4.7:
sheet

Notional Example: Re-Assessed Summary Work-

formed to determine the malicious intention of concern’s potential impact to the organization, should the intention be successfully exercised. The malicious intention’s
composite vulnerability classification level determines through mapping the MIVA
and MIPIA results to the composite matrix. Additional mitigation strategies are
applied and the malicious intention’s vulnerability classification level is re-assessed.
The re-assessment supported the expected results, which also verified the DSS tool
performed as intended.
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations
This chapter presents the research conclusions, significance, and recommended areas
for future research.
5.1

Problem Summary
Identifying specific malicious actions authorized users can perform, pose a diffi-

cult problem for security personnel. An organization’s inability to define the threats
do to malicious insiders (MI) makes it difficult to assess the effectiveness of mitigation
strategies and subsequently protect critical information from being exploited.
An insider threat malicious action taxonomy model is needed that organizations
can use to identify MI actions of concern. Organizations also need to understand the
impact of MI actions. Additionally, organizations need a method to assess the effectiveness of MI mitigation strategies. Knowledge of potential impact levels as well
as the effectiveness of malicious insider mitigation strategies, will assist information
owners in implementing mitigation strategies that provide an acceptable level of information risk.
5.2

Conclusions of this Research
The goals of this research were to extend and improve an existing insider threat

taxonomy model and develop a composite vulnerability assessment process that can
adequately determine an organization’s current MI vulnerability levels.
5.2.1 Malicious Intent Driven Taxonomy Model.

The ITFDM is further de-

composed to characterize malicious intentions and associated actions. The extended
ITFDM provides information owners with a framework to identify MI intentions of
concern and associated actions. The extended ITFDM’s enhanced robustness and
adaptability is demonstrated through a notional example. This example illustrates
how the improved model provides organizations a practical means of identifying po-
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tential malicious actions that pose a threat to their information and information
systems.
5.2.2 Composite Vulnerability Assessment.

This research introduces a frame-

work for measuring MI vulnerability levels. The MIVA process provides a functional
method for measuring the effectiveness of MI mitigation strategies. The MIVA process’s focus includes: (1) critical information owners identifying MI intentions of
concern and associated actions, and (2) assessing the effectiveness of MI mitigation
strategies to prevent, detect, and respond to each malicious intention of concern.
The usefulness of the MIVA process in assessing MI vulnerability is demonstrated by
applying it to a particular scenario.
The MIPIA process provides critical information owners with a functional method
to determine the impact of a MI succeeding. The MIPIA process includes assessing
the potential impact to each of the common security objectives (confidentiality, integrity, and availability- CIA). The CIA assessment results are combined to determine
a successfully performed malicious intention’s overall potential impact. The usefulness
of the MIPIA process in determining malicious intention’s potential impact classification levels are illustrated through a notional example, demonstrating that the MIPIA
process provides information owners a means of assessing the potential impact from
successfully realized malicious actions.
5.3

Significance of this Research
Though not the primary focus of this research, the ITFDM was further de-

composed to include malicious intentions and associated actions. Incorporating these
components into the ITFDM significantly improved the model’s robustness and usability.
This research also developed an MI vulnerability assessment methodology that
enables information owners to: (1) identify malicious intentions of concern using
the ITFDM, (2) determine the effectiveness of the organization’s existing mitiga78

tion strategies via the MIVA process, (3) determine potential impact resulting from
successful malicious actions via the MIPIA process, and (4) derive a composite vulnerability for the various malicious intentions of concern.
Unlike previous work, this research uses a granular approach by evaluating each
security element (i.e., PDR) and objective (i.e., CIA) individually. This provides
an aggregate level of risk assessment (i.e., vulnerability and impact assessment) that
enables information owners to reduce MI risks to an acceptable level. In addition,
the methodologies add quantitative values (using the rank reciprocal rule) to provide
information owners a better sense of their organization’s vulnerability levels than can
be provided by qualitative values alone.
Additionally, this research developed an intuitive DSS tool that more precisely
assesses the composite risk of an organizations information and information systems.
The insider threat vulnerability assessment tool can be applied across various organizational domains to select appropriate MI mitigation strategies.
5.4

Recommendations for Future Research
5.4.1 Developing Threat-Based Variations to ITFDM.

The expanded insider

threat taxonomy model focused on malicious actions that could be performed by
typical system users to carry out an employee’s malicious intentions. The ITFDM
could be further decomposed according to the various types of information system
users (e.g., system administrator, contractors, system maintenance personnel, etc.).
Further categorizing the threat could be achieved by developing separate ITFDM
models for each threat (i.e.. information system users).
5.4.2 MI Vulnerability Assessment Values.

This research used the rank

reciprocal rule and definition tables to both quantify and qualify organization’s MI
threat levels. Future research could explore other methods of determining an organization’s MI vulnerability levels that provide a more meaningful vulnerability assessment
results.
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5.4.3 Extend Proof-of-Concept Tool.

The proof of concept tool was devel-

oped to provide critical information owners with a working application that applies the
fundamental MI vulnerability concepts from this research. The inactive-based DSS
tool does not provide information owners with recommended MI mitigation strategies
to lower an organizations residual risk. The tool could incorporate a active-based
DSS approach that recommends applicable mitigation strategies according the assessed vulnerability levels. For example, if an organization’s mitigation strategies MI
response ability were assessed as low (i.e., high vulnerability), an improved activebased DSS tool could provide appropriate mitigation strategies to improve the MI
response effectiveness and to decrease MI vulnerability levels.
5.5

Summary
This research provides information owners a MI vulnerability assessment method-

ology, along with a DSS tool to assess an organization’s MI vulnerability levels. Furthermore, the vulnerability assessment methodology and tool’s application can be
applied across organizational domains (e.g., Department of Defense, e-business, or
manufacturing).
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Appendix A. NASA Physical Security Vulnerability Analysis
Worksheet
NASA Form 1713.

Figure A.1: NASA Physical Security Vulnerability Risk Analysis Worksheet
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Appendix B. NIST 800-30 Risk Assessment Methodology Flowchart

NIST 800-30
Risk Assessment Activities
Step 1
System Characterization
Step 2
Threat Identification

Step 3
Vulnerability Identification

Step 4
Control Analysis
Step 5
Likelihood Determination

Step 6. Impact Analysis
----------------------------• Loss of Integrity
• Loss of Availability
• Loss of Confidentiality

Step 7
Risk Determination
Step 8
Control Recommendations
Step 9
Results Documentation

Figure B.1:

Risk Assessment Methodology Flowchart
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Appendix C. ITFDM: Action, Alteration, Snooping, and Elevation
These are the functionally decomposed MI four protection states models.
Alteration

Alter Content

Alter System

Disrupt Network Performance and Reliability

Disrupt an Organizations Ability to Make Informed Decisions

Exploit Unpatched Systems

Malicious Modification of
Key Information from Data Files

Launch Distributed Denial of Service Attack (DDOS)
Insertion of Misinformation into Data Files
Attack System with Known Exploit
Zero Day Attacks

Destruction of Critical Data

Injecting Buffer Overflows
Reformat Hard Drive
Delete Critical Database
Take Over and/or Corrupt Computers
Delete Critical Data
Install Virus using a USB Device
Conceal Malicious Behavior

Install Virus using a CD/DVD
Install Virus using a Floppy Drive

Steganography

Install Virus using Mobile Code
Install Virus through E-mail Attachments

Encryption Tools

Install Logic Bomb

Event Log Tampering

Install Worm
Install Trojan Horse
Install Browser Hijacker
Install Backdoor
Install Dialer
Install Rootkit
Lock out Administrator Access
Lock out System Users
Create Rogue Accounts
Unauthorized User Activity Monitoring

Install Spyware
Install Sniffer
Install Keystroke Logger
Install Surveillance Software

Figure C.1:

Insider Threat Decomposed Alteration Model
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Content
Distribution

Unauthorized File Distribution

Upload Files to FTP Sites

Post Files to HTTP Sites

E-mail Files

Copy Files to a CD/DVD

Copy Files to a USB Device

Copy Files to a Floppy Drive

Copy Files to a Zip Drive

Print Files

Pass Files through Covert Channels

Reverse Tunneling

Dead Drops

Figure C.2:

Insider Threat Decomposed Distribution Model
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Snooping

Footprinting

Scanning

Gather Publicly Available Target
Information

Identify Live Hosts

Enumeration

Probe Known Systems for
Weaknesses and Information

Probe for Organizational
Phone Numbers

Executing DOS Ping Commands

Execute Telnet Commands

Probe for Organizational
Contact Names

Executing Ping Sweep Utilities

Execute Netcat Commands

Identify Running Services
on Live Hosts

Probe for Organizational Contact
E-mail Addresses
Probe for Organizational
Security Policies

Collect User Account
Information through Null
Sessions

Execute TCP SYN Scans

File Snooping

Unauthorized File
Access
Accessing Unprotected
Files via Shared Drives
Take Ownership of Files
using Admin Access
Upgrade File Permissions
using Admin Access
Access other Users EMail using Admin Access

Execute TCP ACK Scans
Probe for Organizational Servers
Execute DOS
netcat Commands
Execute Automated
Port Scans

Identify Target Domain Names and
Associated Networks
Collect Network Information
Collect Register Information
Collect Domain Information
Collect Administrative Contacts Information

IP Address to Hostname Mapping
Execute DNS Zone Transfers
Executing nslookup DOS Commands

Discover Target Network Topology
Executing Traceroute DOS Commands

Figure C.3:

Insider Threat Decomposed Snooping Model

85

Accessing User Files through
Unattended Terminal

Elevation of
Privleges

Gain Unauthorized System and/or Data Access
Execute HK Tool from DOS Prompt
Compromise Administrator Account
NT Offline Editor to Reset/Erase Admin Password
Injecting Buffer Overflows

Figure C.4:

Insider Threat Decomposed Elevation Model
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